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Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal 
Conspiracy Law' 
By 
SARAH N. WELLING* 
The concept of conspiracy currently plays a significant role in 
three areas of substantive law: antitrust, civil rights, and criminal law. 
Although the role of conspiracy in these substantive areas oflaw differs 
in many ways, all three require that the conspiracy consist of a plurality 
of actors. Determining what constitutes a plurality of actors when all 
the alleged conspirators are agents l of a single corporation poses a con-
tinuing problem. 
This problem raises two distinct questions. The first is whether, 
when one agent acts alone within the scope of corporate business, the 
agent and the corporation constitute a plurality. The second question 
is whether, when several agents of a single corporation act together in 
furtherance of the corporation's business, a plurality is established or 
there is just one actor, the corporation, operating through multiple 
agents. These questions have plagued antitrust law for some time, and 
more recently have arisen in civil rights law. 
The issue of what constitutes the requisite plurality also has arisen 
under general criminal conspiracy laws. The law in this area is uncer-
tain. Courts have had trouble framing the issues correctly and have 
relied on inappropriate precedents in making their decisions. At times, 
courts also have avoided confronting the issue directly, or simply have 
failed to analyze the question carefully. The result has been confusion 
regarding what constitutes a plurality in an intracorporate situation for 
the purpose of criminal conspiracy laws. 
This Article examines the law on the plurality required for con-
spiracy under the criminal law in the two intracorporate fact patterns 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1974, University ofWis-
consin; J.D. 1978, University of Kentucky. 
1. Throughout this Article, the term "agent" is used as it is defined in the Model Penal 
Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(b) (proposed Official Draft 1962): "'[A]gent' 
means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of 
the corporation or association ...• " 
[1155] 
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outlined above, and examines the differences between the plurality re-
quired for civil rights and antitrust conspiracies on the one hand and 
criminal conspiracies on the other. The Article begins with a brief his-
tory of conspiracy and an introduction to its roles in various areas of 
law. The plurality component of conspiracy is then examined in detail 
in two areas, antitrust and civil rights, to determine how plurality is 
defined in those areas and the rationale behind the definition. 
After a brief discussion of corporate criminal liability and criminal 
conspiracy generally, the plurality requirement for criminal conspiracy 
is examined in detail. The Article concludes by proposing an analysis 
for the definition of corporate criminal conspiracy based on the sub-
stantive goals of criminal conspiracy law. Under this analysis, the plu-
rality requirement is not met when a corporation and only a single 
agent are involved. When two or more agents of a corporation con-
spire, however, liability is not precluded. In this second situation, the 
question is whether agents of the same corporation can constitute a plu-
rality. If they can, the liability of the corporation for the actions of its 
agents should be determined under the usual standards of corporate 
criminal liability. 
The question whether multiple agents of a single corporation can 
constitute a plurality has been answered differently by the courts in 
different contexts. In antitrust and civil rights cases, courts have gener-
ally held that multiple agents are not a plurality. This Article con-
cludes that such decisions reflect policy considerations unique to these 
areas of law, and that their reasoning is not apposite to criminal con-
spiracy. In the general criminal conspiracy context, the best approach 
is to analyze plurality with reference to the underlying purposes of 
criminal conspiracy law. The Article concludes that a rule that finds 
the requisite plurality in multiple agents of a single corporation will 
best further those purposes. 
A Historical Overview of Conspiracy 
The crime of conspiracy originated in a series of statutes passed in 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.2 The statutes were 
designed to eliminate a narrowly defined problem: combinations of 
conspirators that maintained vexatious suits or procured improper in-
dictments or appeals.3 The first significant expansion of the scope of 
2. See generally Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393, 394-409 (1922) 
[hereinafter cited as Sayre]; Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. 
REV. 920, 922-23 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Criminal Conspiracy]. 
3. Sayre, supra note 2, at 396. 
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conspiracy occurred in the early seventeenth century when the Court of
Star Chamber held that "confederating together constituted the gist of
the offense."4 This shift in focus from the specific object of the conspir-
acy to the conspiracy itself resulted in a less certain definition of the
necessary objective, which under the specific statutes was limited to
confederations for the purpose of defeating the just administration of
the law.
5
Another important expansion of the law of conspiracy occurred
during the seventeenth century: the definition of conspiracy was
stretched to include combinations that had as their object any crime,
not only those that endeavored to obstruct the administration of jus-
tice.6 Finally, during the early eighteenth century, the concept grew to
include conspiracies aimed at noncriminal acts; conspiracy could be
based on an agreement either to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful
act by unlawful means.7 This extremely broad definition of conspiracy
is still used by modem courts."
Today, the concept of conspiracy is important in at least three dis-
tinct substantive areas of law: federal antitrust law, federal civil rights
law, and criminal law.9 Under the Sherman Act, both civil and crimi-
nal liability may be imposed for certain prohibited types of conspira-
cies. 10 Section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 establishes civil
sanctions for conspiracies by providing a cause of action for persons
injured by certain types of conspiracies.I Finally, under criminal laws,
4. Id at 398, referring to the Poulterers' Case, 9 Coke 55b (1611).
5. Id. at 398-400. Professor Sayre characterizes the Poulterers' Case as "the first step
in the long process by which the early rigidly defined crime of conspiracy was, through
judicial, analogical extension, gradually expanded into the vague and uncertain doctrine
which we know to-day." Id at 398.
6. Id at 400.
7. Id at 402-06. Professor Sayre concludes that this extension did not originate in the
case law, but resulted instead from an ambiguous and unwarranted statement by Hawkins in
his Pleas af the Crown (1716). Id at 402.
8. Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 622 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980)
(civil conspiracy); Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir.
1973) (civil conspiracy); cf. United States v. DeLoache, 279 F. Supp. 720, 729 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (criminal conspiracy).
9. Conspiracy is also a common law tort doctrine. See, e.g., Johnston v. Baker, 445
F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971) (conspiracy to hinder business); May v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
189 Kan. 419,380 P.2d 390 (1962) (alleged conspiracy to cause discharge from employment).
For a discussion of how tort principles have been applied in corporate conspiracy cases, see
note 112 infra.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2,42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979) (formerly
§ 1985(c)).
various conspiracies are prohibited as crimes. 12 The statutes establish-
ing these conspiracy actions are similar in that they are all relatively
skeletal; therefore, much of the responsibility for defining conspiracy
has fallen to the courts, and conspiracy must be examined primarily
through case law.
Plurality Under the Antitrust Laws
Conspiracy is prohibited by two antitrust statutes.1 3 Section 1 of
the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, 14 and sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies to monopolize trade.'
5
In contrast to other antitrust statutes, which permit unilateral violations
and so pose no question of plurality, 16 these conspiracy provisions of
the Sherman Act require a plurality of actors to establish a violation. 17
Conspiracy Between a Single Agent and the Corporation
A person's conduct, even if clearly in restraint of trade, cannot be
reached by section 1 of the Sherman Act if there is no contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy. 18 When a single agent of a corporation has acted
alone to restrain trade, the plaintiff sometimes has sought to bring the
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
13. For the purpose of discussing the plurality requirement of conspiracies under the
Sherman Act, there is no difference between civil antitrust actions and criminal antitrust
actions. No distinction is made in this Article. See United States v. American Precision
Prods. Corp., 115 F. Supp. 823 (D.N.J. 1953) (elements of civil and criminal conspiracies
under Sherman Act are the same).
For a general discussion of criminal antitrust conspiracies, see Developmens-Criminal
Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 1000-08 (1959).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15. Id. § 2. Section 2 also prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize. Vio-
lation of these provisions of § 2 requires no plurality and may be committed by one person.
United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1906), appeal dis-
missed, 212 U.S. 585 (1908).
16. See, e.g., Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620,
625 (9th Cir. 1977) (antitrust conspiracy requires plurality of actors concerting their efforts
towards a common goal); Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103,
105 (W.D. Tex. 1960) (conspiracy or combination, whether to restrain trade or create a mo-
nopoly, requires at least two parties); Becker-Lehmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
202 F. Supp. 514, 516 (E.D. Mo. 1959) (same).
18. Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton Indus. Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (proof of combination or conspiracy essential under
§ I of Sherman Act and conspiracy portion of § 2); Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales,
Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) (§ 1 of Sherman Act requires joint action and agreement
between two or more parties); ATT'Y GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 31 (1955) ("Restraining trade is not illegal, but only contracting,
combining and conspiring in restraint of trade.").
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defendant's conduct within section 1 of the Act by alleging a conspiracy
between the individual agent and his or her corporation. 19 The courts
uniformly have rejected the argument that an individual's actions
within .the scope of employment constitute a conspiracy between the
individual and the employer-corporation.
The leading case involving an alleged conspiracy between an indi-
vidual and a corporation is Union Pacofc Coal Co. v. United States.2°
In that case, the government charged that the defendants combined to
restrain trade by refusing to deal with various parties. The five defend-
ants, the Union Pacific Coal Company; its employee and general agent,
Moore; two railroad companies; and their superintendent, Bucking-
ham, were convicted. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that thdre
was insufficient evidence that the two railroad companies and Bucking-
ham had combined with Moore and the coal company in a refusal to
deal, and reversed the convictions of the railroad rconipanies and
Buckingham.
The government argued that Moore and the coal company had
combined with each other to restrain trade. Rejecting this contention,
the court noted that the evidence showed that no one from the com-
pany besides Moore was involved in the refusal to deal. The court con-
cluded that one person alone could not form a combination just
because he or she had acted on behalf of the corporation; there must be
two or more minds involved.
21
Cases subsequent to Union Pacfc have reached the same result,
but without such clear analysis. In Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert,22 the
defendants filed a third party complaint alleging that the third party
defendants, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. and its president and sole
shareholder, William Goldman, conspired to control the theater busi-
ness in Philadelphia in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The district court dismissed the third party complaint on the
ground that a corporation could not conspire with its own agent. The
19. See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960). For a discussion
of Goldlawr, see text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
No comparable arguments are necessary under § 2, because a defendant acting unilat-
erally may be liable for monopolization or attempted monopolization. See note 15 supra.
20. 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909).
21. Id at 745: "[A] corporation can act only by an agent, and every time an agent
commits an offense within the scope of his authority under [the government's] theory the
corporation necessarily combines with him to commit it. This cannot be, and it is not, the
law. The union of two or more persons, the conscious participation in the scheme of two or
more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful combination, and it cannot be created by the
action of one man alone."
22. 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
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third party plaintiffs appealed, arguing that, as Goldman was the sole
shareholder of William Goldman Theatres, Inc., the relationship was
analogous to a parent-subsidiary relationship, and the plurality for
conspiracy existed.
23
On appeal, the Third Circuit distinguished the parent-subsidiary
cases as involving "separate corporate conspirators.1 24  The court
stated that, in contrast, the facts of Goldlawr indicated that there was
only one party, William Goldman Theatres, Inc., acting through its
proper agent, Goldman. Therefore, the conspiracy claim failed for lack
of a plurality, and the dismissal of the third party complaint was
affirmed.
The court's analysis of the plurality question is brief and unen-
lightening. The court did not explain whether any person apart from
William Goldman was involved in the alleged violation. The court's
language and holding imply that no one else was involved. If no one
else was involved, however, the court's use of precedents seems flawed.
The court relied on Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc. ,25 a
leading case involving multiple employees of one company, rather than
on Union Pacpic Coal Co. v. United States.26 Nevertheless, the court
reached the same conclusion as that of Union Pacific: one agent and
his or her corporation do not constitute a plurality.
In Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co. ,27 the plaintiff sued
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton
Act,28 alleging that the defendants had conspired to refuse him access
to used corrugated boxes. The five defendants initially included were
Houston Corrugated Box Company (HCB), the plaintiffs competitor in
buying used boxes; Joe Levy, an officer of HCB; and three companies
that sold used boxes: Frito-Lay, Inc., Oak Farms Dairies, and the
Coca-Cola Company. Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
Oak Farms Dairies and the Coca-Cola Company. As to the remaining
three defendants, the essence of the plaintiffs complaint was that Frito-
Lay had conspired with HCB and its agent, Joe Levy, to sell its boxes to
HCB instead of to the plaintiff. Granting summary judgment for the
three defendants, the district court concluded that there was no evi-
23. The plaintiffs cited three cases for the proposition that a conspiracy could exist
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Id at 617 n.4.
24. Id. at 617.
25. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). For a discussion of
Nelson Radio, see notes 36-38 & accompanying text infra.
26. 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909); see notes 20-21 & accompanying text supra.
27. 526 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1976).
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dence of an agreement or conspiracy in restraint of trade among the
three defendants.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that "[i]t is well-settled that
the Sherman Act's conspiracy or agreement requirement is not met by a
'conspiracy' between a corporation and its corporate officer .... -
As in Union Pac?c, the plurality question in Solomon arose be-
cause some defendants were eliminated as conspirators by a lack of
evidence.30 Once these defendants were disqualified as conspirators,
the conspiracy had to exist, if at all, between the individual defendant
and the company he represented. Like Goldlawr,31 the Solomon opin-
ion is unclear. The court does not mention any HCB employees other
than Joe Levy. If no one else was involved, the court's reliance on
Nelson Radio, which involved multiple employees, rather than on
Union Pacfc, was misleading.
The cases, however, are uniform in holding that an individual em-
ployee who restrains trade while acting as a corporate agent is not lia-
ble for conspiracy under the antitrust laws. To supply the requisite
plurality for a conspiracy, there must be the conscious participation of
two or more minds. One reason for this rule is that, if plurality were
held to be established by one individual acting on behalf of a corpora-
tion, conspiracy liability would then be automatic: every time a corpo-
rate agent acted within the scope of employment, he or she would
necessarily conspire with the corporation.
32
Conspiracy Among Several Agents of a Single Corporation
A different question is presented when the alleged antitrust con-
spiracy involves several agents of a single company. In this situation,
the requirement of the conscious participation of two minds is met.
The Supreme Court has avoided the question whether the employees of
29. 526 F.2d at 396. Thus, no conspiracy could be based on the relationship between
HCB and Levy, and the illegal agreement had to exist, if at all, between Frito-Lay and either
HCB or Joe Levy. The court found that Frito-Lay had ceased doing business with the plain-
tiff for individually motivated reasons and not because of an agreement with anyone.
Therefore, the court held, all defendants were eliminated as possible conspirators and the
summary judgment in favor of defendants was proper.
30. Id.
31. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960). See notes 22-24 & accom-
panying text supra.
32. Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of lntra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT.
L. REv. 158, 180 (1962) (if there is only one active participant, "regardless of whether the
action is brought against the corporation, the officer.., or both, the only possible result
upon grounds of both logic and precedent, is that a violation of the conspiracy portions of
the Sherman Act can not exist") [hereinafter cited as Barndt].
one corporation establish the plurality required for conspiracy under
the antitrust laws. 33 The result has been a split of authority among the
circuits.
34
Under the majority rule, employees of the same company cannot
supply the plurality necessary to establish conspiracy. 35 The leading
case articulating this position is Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,
In. 36 The plaintiff was a wholesale distributor of electric appliances
supplied by Motorola. When Motorola insisted on new terms for the
plaintiff's franchise, the plaintiff refused and Motorola subsequently
declined to renew the plaintiff's distributorship contract.
The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between Motorola and its presi-
dent, its sales manager, and other employees and agents in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the
basis that the required plurality did not exist.
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with
itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general
rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation.
37
The court's analysis in Nelson Radio is confusing. First, although
it may be characterized as "basic" that conspiracy requires two persons
in the sense of two minds, it is not basic to all forms of conspiracy that
two entities or two persons, in the sense of two business associations, be
involved. If the court meant that two entities are basic to conspiracy
under the antitrust laws, to avoid confusion it should have stated this
33. In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), the government filed a
civil action against five defendants, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, a conspiracy to monopolize under § 2, and an attempt to monopolize
under § 2. The five defendants were the Lorain Journal Company and four of its executive
officers. Holding that the defendants had attempted to monopolize, the district court entered
an injunction against them. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and
confined itself exclusively to a discussion of whether the defendants' conduct constituted an
attempt to monopolize.
Cf. Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 1000 ("The Court's language
suggests that there can be a conspiracy among the directors of a corporation acting in their
official capacity.") (footnote omitted); see also id at 1000 n.614.
34. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 114, at 324 (1977) (stating that "the directly relevant
case law is sharply split"). Compare Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (no plurality established by agents of
single corporation under § 1 of Sherman Act) with Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) (plurality established by officers and agents of
single corporation under § 1 of Sherman Act).
35. See cases cited in note 77 infra.
36. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
37. Id. at 914.
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explicitly.
38
Second, the Nelson Radio court stated that a corporation cannot
conspire "with" itself. A more pertinent question is whether the corpo-
ration can be held as a conspirator for the acts of more than one of its
agents. Although in effect, the Fifth Circuit answered this question in
the negative, the court's framing of the issue predestined the result.
The position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Nelson Radio has been
adopted by other courts.39 For example, the Eighth Circuit, in Morton
Buildings of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Buildings, Inc. ,40 held that multi-
ple employees of a single company cannot constitute the plurality nec-
essary for a Sherman Act conspiracy. The plaintiff was a distributor of
prefabricated buildings manufactured by the defendant, Morton Build-
ings. When Morton Buildings terminated the plaintiff's distributorship
contract, the plaintiff sued Morton Buildings and several individual
employees of Morton Buildings, alleging a conspiracy in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court entered judgment for
the defendants. On appeal, the court noted that it was difficult to iden-
tify the plaintiff's theory of conspiracy, but held that, "[t]o the extent
that [the plaintiff] bases his theory on a conspiracy between Morton
and the individual defendants, the action cannot be maintained."''a The
theory of conspiracy failed because of the lack of a plurality.
Many courts have echoed this majority position.4 2 The rationale
for the rule, however, is unclear. The court in Nelson Radio based its
38. Confusion has resulted regarding both civil rights conspiracies and criminal con-
spiracies. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257
n.1 17 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (civil
rights) (characterizing Nelson Radio as the "fountainhead of the precept" that a corporation
cannot conspire with its officers); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129, slip op.
at 2 (E.D. Va. July 6, 1976) (criminal) (citing Nelson Radio); see also Note, Intracorporate
Conspiracies Under 42 US. C. § 1985(c), 92 HARv. L. REv. 470, 479-82 (1978) (Nelson Radio
is "main precedent" relied on in civil rights cases) [hereinafter cited as Intracorporate
Conspiracies].
39. See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 n.9 (9th Cir.
1969) ("A corporation cannot conspire with its officers or agents to violate the antitrust
laws."); Gordon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 330 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909
(1964) (because individual defendants acted only on behalf of corporate defendant and not
on their own behalf, there was no conspiracy as required under § 1 of Sherman Act).
40. 531 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1976).
41. Id at 916.
42. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979); H & B
Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); Ray v. United Fam-
ily Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 421 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1976); Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400
(W.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd, 511 F.2d 1393 (1975); South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, 237 F. Supp. 650
(N.D. Ill. 1965); Marion County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
justification of the rule primarily on the requirements of conspiracy
doctrine rather than on antitrust law.43 This approach is confusing, be-
cause conspiracy has different requirements in different substantive
contexts. Later decisions adopting Nelson Radio have been no more
enlightening.44
The most convincing explanation for the majority rule was offered
in 1955 by the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws:
Restraining trade is not illegal, but only contracting, combining,
and conspiring in restraint of trade. Since a corporation can only act
through its officers, and since the normal commercial conduct of a
single trader acting alone may restrain trade, many activities of any
business could be interdicted were joint action solely by agents of a
single corporation acting on its behalf held to constitute a conspiracy
in restraint of trade.4
5
As the Attorney General's report makes clear, the rule is based not on
conspiracy law but on antitrust policy. If the employees of a single
company were held to establish the requisite plurality for conspiracy,
companies and their employees regularly would violate the antitrust
laws, and most business activity would be illegal.46 The majority rule is
also justified because conspiracy within a single corporation does not
1953), afl'd, 214 F.2d 557 (1954); Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D.
Md. 1937).
Although the Third Circuit cited with approval and relied on Nelson Radio in Gold-
lawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960), discussed in text accompanying notes 22-
24 supra, it has more recently suggested its disapproval of Nelson Radio. See Novotny v.
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257 n.117 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424, 427 (3d
Cir. 1971).
43. 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). See note 37 &
accompanying text supra.
44. Most courts that have adopted the rule of no plurality merely restate the rule and
then cite Nelson Radio. Id. See, e.g., Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531
F.2d 910, 916-17 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1976); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d
635, 643 n.9 (9th Cir. 1969); Gordon v. Illnois Bell Tel. Co., 330 F.2d 103, 107 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964). The courts that attempt to offer an explanation for the rule
offer only the most cursory explanation. See, e.g., H & B Equipment Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. ATTY GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 31 (1955).
46. For example, a decision by the board of directors on the price to charge for a prod-
uct technically might qualify as a price fixing conspiracy. This potential for overbroad anti-
trust liability is precluded by the restrictive definition of plurality. ATr'y GEN., REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 31 (1955); Stengel, Intra-En-
terprise Conspiracy Under Section J of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5, 8 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Stengel]. See Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353, 1358
(W.D.N.C. 1977).
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raise any of the anticompetitive concerns that the antitrust laws were
designed to eliminate.
47
A minority of jurisdictions concluded that several employees of a
single company can constitute a sufficient plurality for liability under
antitrust conspiracy laws. In the leading case adopting this view, Pat-
terson v. United Sates,48 the Sixth Circuit sustained the convictions of
the defendants, twenty-eight officers and agents of a cash register com-
pany, for antitrust violations. The defendants had gained control over
ninety-five percent of the cash register market through various coercive
practices. The court held that the defendants' conduct violated both
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
[Section 2] includes conspiracies between competitors, or between the
officers and agents of a competitor on its behalf against a competitor.
But it is not limited to such conspiracies. It includes also conspira-
cies between any persons, whoever they may be, against any other
person .... Clearly, then, a conspiracy between the officers and
agents of one competitor on its behalf in restraint of a single inter-
state sale or shipment of another competitor is covered by it.49
Another case implicitly finding a sufficient plurality in an intracor-
porate conspiracy is White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theater Corp. 50
The Eighth Circuit sustained the conviction of a corporation that ex-
hibited motion pictures, holding that the corporation and its officers
had conspired in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Patterson and White Bear are the only reported cases that have
held or implied that the employees of a single company can compose
the plurality of parties contemplated by the antitrust conspiracy laws.
These cases, however, are not persuasive. In Patterson, no argument
was made against intracorporate plurality; thus, the court did not con-
sider this preliminary question.5 1 Furthermore, as the corporation was
not a defendant, no question of corporate liability arose. In White
Bear, the court's specific holding is obscured because the court dis-
cussed attempt to monopolize along with conspiracy to monopolize.52
47. See Ray v. United States Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (W.D.N.C.
1977). See generally Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 1001-02 (recount-
ing justifications for the rule of no plurality).
48. 222 F. 599 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915).
49. Id at 618-19.
50. 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942).
51. See Barndt, supra note 32, at 181 (no argument made against intracorporate con-
spiracy and liability of corporation not considered); Stengel, supra note 46, at 6 (notwith-
standing clear violation of § 2, court was "not content" and made unnecessary statements
regarding conspiracy under § 1).
52. The court based its decision on § 2 of the Sherman Act, and although it did not
need to reach the plaintifis § 1 allegations, discussed and ruled on that area as well. 129
Finally, the vitality of White Bear is questionable in light of the Eighth
Circuit's recent contrary holding in Morton Buildings of Nebraska, Inc.
v. Morton Buildings, Inc. 53
Despite the controversy among commentators regarding the status
of the law, 54 and the split in the cases, 55 the majority position is that
employees of a single company cannot constitute the plurality of par-
ties required for a conspiracy under the antitrust laws.56 Although in-
frequently articulated, the best rationale for this position is that, if
agents of a single company were held to establish plurality, the agents
and corporation would often violate the antitrust laws when making
routine business decisions. The definition of plurality for antitrust con-
spiracies is based on policies of substantive antitrust law, policies that
are not involved in general conspiracy law.
The soundness of the majority position is controversial.5 7 While
the rule has been endorsed because an alternative may lead to unlim-
F.2d at 602 n.3. The court stated that a monopoly under § 2 is a type of restraint of trade
under § 1. Id This comment by the court has led to controversy. Some commentators have
interpreted White Bear as holding that plurality for § 1 is established by an intracorporate
conspiracy. See ATT'Y GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 31 (1955) ("[P]laintiffs in both cases [Patterson and White Bear] charged viola-
tions of Section 2, thus making unnecessary to the result the brief of discussion of the
applicability of Section 1 .... "); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act,
63 YALE L.J. 372, 386 (1954) (§ 1 violation sustained in White Bear). In contrast, other
commentators argue that White Bear did not reach the question of a conspiracy under § 1.
See Bardt, supra note 32, at 181 (§ 1 conspiracy not considered in White Bear); Stengel,
supra note 46, at 7 (White Bear is no authority for § I conspiracy).
53. 531 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
54. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 114, at 324 (1977) (directly relevant case law
sharply split); Barndt, supra note 32, at 182-85. (cases are not uniform and indicate that
intracorporate conspiracy is possible); Stengel, supra note 46, at 6-7 (Patterson is "high water
mark" of intracorporate conspiracy and all recent decisions are in accord with Nelson Ra-
dio); Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S. C. § 1985(c): The Impact of Novotny v.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 13 GA. L. REv. 591, 614-15 (1979) ("[N]o
court deciding a case under the antitrust laws has held the conspiracy element to be satisfied
when the only conspirators have been officers. . . of a single corporation .. ") [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Impact of Novotny]; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 ofthe
Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 717 (1977) ("Neither officers,
directors [nor employees] . . . within a single corporation have ever been held to have con-
spired with either the corporation or with one another.").
55. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
56. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
57. Compare Stengel, supra note 46, at 8 (agreeing with majority rule of no plurality)
with Barndt, supra note 32, at 185-86 (criticizing majority rule of no plurality in view of
contrary rule under general criminal law) and Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the
Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 386-87 (1954) (criticizing no plurality rule as anomalous in
view of contrary rule applied to multiple corporations within single enterprise).
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ited liability,58 it has been suggested that the potential of limitless lia-
bility could be avoided with more direct approaches based on the
substantive antitrust law rather than on the definition of plurality.
59
Protection from limitless liability would be found either in the require-
ment that the defendants' conduct impose an unreasonable restraint of
trade or in the requirement that the matter be more than a merely pri-
vate controversy. 60 These approaches would avoid the doctrinal rigid-
ity of the plurality rule,61 but provide protection from limitless antitrust
violations.6
2
58. See, e.g., Stengel, supra note 46, at 8.
59. Barndt, supra note 32, at 186; Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at
1003-05; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 386-88
(1954).
60. Barndt, supra note 32, at 186; Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at
1004-05; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the ShermanAct, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 386-88
(1954). Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit all restraints of trade; only unreason-
able restraints are prohibited. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Furthermore, the conduct must result in a
restraint of trade that has an effect on interstate commerce; it may not be merely a private
controversy. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d
1040 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n,
472 F.2d 517, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1972) ("IT]here must be some limit
on the intrusiveness of Sherman Act regulation. Since every enterprise, however localized,
inevitably has some effect, however remote, on the flow of commerce among the states, some
'localness,' 'remoteness,' or 'de minimis' factor must intervene or federal regulation is
boundless.").
These two prerequisites for liability under § I of the Sherman Act would protect a
corporation from limitless antitrust liability even if its agents were defined as a plurality.
61. Commentators have suggested that some uncertainty is natural in antitrust law spe-
cifically and in corporate law generally. Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will:
Developing Standards for Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. L. REV.
389, 417-18 (1980); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 427 (1963). Another commentator has sug-
gested that uncertainty is desirable in corporate law. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 25 n.101 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Stone].
62. There is some indication that courts are moving away from the rigidity of the plu-
raity rule and looking instead at economic realities on a case-by-case basis. In Fuchs Sug-
ars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979),
two sugar brokers sued Amstar, a large sugar refiner, for violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act in terminating the plaintiffs as its general sugar brokers. The trial court found
that Amstar had violated § I for conspiring with its other general brokers to restrain trade.
On appeal, Amstar argued that it was legally incapable of conspiring with its brokers be-
cause they were agents of Amstar and were "economically indistinguishable" from Amstar.
Id at 1030 n.4. The Second Circuit avoided this specific ground for decision, and instead
held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury finding of a conspiracy with
anyone. In reaching this result, however, the court suggested that the determination of plu-
rality is not as conclusive as it once was. "The Sherman Act does not condemn every busi-
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Plurality Under the Civil Rights Laws
Plurality in conspiracy is also an issue under the federal civil rights
laws. Section 1985(3)63 provides a cause of action for persons injured
as a result of a conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights. 64 Sec-
tion 1985(3) at one time was restricted to conspiracies under color of
state law, 65 but in 1971 the Supreme Court ruled that this section also
applied to private conspiracies.
66
Because of the expansion of section 1985(3) to include private con-
spiracies, when a plaintiff is deprived of civil rights by a corporation, he
or she may have a cause of action. A plaintiff, however, still must sat-
isfy the threshold requirement of establishing a conspiracy between
"two or more persons." 67 To meet this plurality requirement in the
intracorporate context, plaintiffs have alleged that a plurality is estab-
lished by the individual corporate agents.68 Although no cases have
ness decision as a § 1 conspiracy merely because it is the product of an agreement between
two persons or entities legally capable of conspiring." Id at 1029-30.
This approach to antitrust conspiracies based on factual analysis of the economic reali-
ties and anticompetitive effect, rather than on rigid rules of plurality, may be more common
in the future. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 927 n.5
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981) (affiliated corporations); Las Vegas Sun,
Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980)
(same).
63. Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979) (formerly
§ 1985(c)).
64. The statute provides: "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire
... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
. . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). The history of
§ 1985(3) is described in Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1238-40 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
65. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 92 (1971); Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651, 661 (1951).
66. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Griffin, the Court rejected its hold-
ing in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that § 1985(3) required state action. The
Court stated that "all indicators-text, companion provisions, and legislative history-point
unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies." 403 U.S. at 101. The Court
concluded that, because the constitutional problems perceived in Collins simply did not ex-
ist, the "artificially restrictive construction of Collins" should be abandoned. Id. at 96.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530
F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976).
68. See, e.g., Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1972);
Dupree v. Hertz Corp., 419 F. Supp. 764, 765-66 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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been reported in which the plaintiff alleged that one agent of a corpora-
tion acting alone established a conspiracy between the agent and the
corporation, 69 it has been alleged that multiple agents of a single corpo-
ration can constitute a plurality capable of conspiracy under section
1985(3).7
0
Conspiracy Among Several Agents of a Single Corporation
Courts have reached different conclusions on the question whether
multiple agents of a single corporation constitute a plurality.71 The
vast majority of courts have held that agents of a single corporation
cannot constitute the plurality of persons necessary for conspiracy
under the federal civil rights laws.72 The leading case espousing this
view is Dombrowski v. Dowling.73 In Dombrowski, the plaintiff was a
criminal law attorney who sued a real estate corporation and two of its
agents under section 1985(3), claiming that the defendants had con-
spired to refuse to rent him office space because many of his clients
were black or Latin. The district court entered summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.74 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the
section 1985(3) claim, holding that the plurality element was not estab-
lished. The statutory requirement of "two or more persons" was
not satisfied by proof that a discriminatory business decision reflects
the collective judgment of two or more executives of the same firm.
We do not suggest that an agent's action within the scope of his au-
thority will always avoid a conspiracy finding. . . . But if the chal-
lenged conduct is essentially a single act of discrimination by a single
business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the
69. Cases involving an alleged conspiracy between an agent and a corporation based
solely on the actions of the agent have arisen under the antitrust laws, see text accompanying
notes 18-32 supra, and under the general criminal law, see text accompanying notes 158-80
infra.
70. See generally The Impact of Novotny, supra note 54; Intracorporate Conspiracies,
supra note 38.
71. Compare Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1262 (3d
Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (multiple agents of a
single corporation establish plurality) with Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th
Cir. 1972) (multiple agents of a single corporation do not establish plurality).
Several courts have noted the split of authority on the definition of plurality under the
civil rights laws. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408-09 n.16 (2d Cir. 1975);
Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1978); Cap v. Lehigh Univ., 433 F. Supp.
1275, 1282 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
72. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 73-77 infra and cases cited in note
77 infra. See generally The Impact of Novotny, supra note 54, at 605 n.57; Intracorporate
Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 471.
73. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). This case was decided under the pre-1980 codification
of the statute at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
74. 459 F.2d at 191-92.
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decision or in the act itself will normally not constitute the conspir-
acy contemplated by this statute.
75
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Dombrowski has been followed
in other circuits. 76 Although many courts have adopted the Dombrow-
ski rule,77 the rationale of these cases is unclear. The Seventh Circuit's
explanation that Dombrowski involved essentially a single act by a sin-
gle business entity means little. The court did not explain why the par-
ticipation of several individuals should be ignored and their conduct
characterized as a single act by a single entity. Most courts adopting
the Dombrowski position merely quote that decision without offering
any further explanation or justification.7  The courts do not reveal
what goals or policies of section 1985(3) 79 are served by defining plural-
ity to confer immunity on individuals working for a single corporation
who would otherwise be liable under the civil rights law.8 0 The best
explanation for the rule81 is judicial concern that section 1985(3) needs
75. Id at 196.
76. In Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 974 (1976), the plaintiff sued a corporation and the individual officers and directors of
the corporation. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to deprive her of her
civil rights, in violation of § 1985(3), by refusing to place stock in the corporation in her
name because of her sex. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim because
there was no conspiracy; the individual defendants were merely carrying out the corpora-
tion's policy. Id at 67-68. Relying on Dombrowski, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court decision. Id at 70-72. As there was no allegation that the individual defendants acted
in other than their official capacities, the situation involved only the implementation of a
single policy by a single corporation. Thus, the defendants were "safely within the area of
the Dombrowski decision . Id at 71; accord Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1978).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has relied on Dombrowski to hold that agents of a single
corporation do not constitute a plurality capable of conspiracy under § 1985(3). Baker v.
Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1974).
77. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 915 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Johnson v. University of Pitt., 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1370 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Rubenstein v.
Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Keddie v. Pennsylvania
State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Milburn v. Blackafrica Promotions,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
78. See, e.g., Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Corp., 505 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir.
1974). See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
79. Section 1985(3) serves essentially three purposes: compensation, deterrence, and
punishment. See Intracorporate Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 486-87.
80. Individuals who conspire would be liable under § 1985(3) unless they worked for
the same company, which would make them immune under Dombrowski. In the context of
government bureaucracies, there is no comparable rule of no plurality. See, e.g., Hampton
v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
81. Although the courts have not explained why they adopted the rule prohibiting in-
tracorporate plurality, it has been suggested that the rule may have resulted from qualms
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some limiting principle to preclude it from becoming a general federal
tort law.8 2
Courts often have found the majority rule unacceptable, and have
created exceptions based on the equivocal language of Dombrowski.
8 3
First, based on the Seventh Circuit's reference to a "single act of dis-
crimination, ' 84 some courts have found that Dombrowski is inapplica-
ble when there are "many continuing instances of discrimination,"
rather than a single act.85 Second, based on the Seventh Circuit's refer-
ence to a "single business entity,"'8 6 it has been held that Dombrowski
does not apply when the individuals, although acting for the same cor-
poration, represent distinct decisionmaking units within the corpora-
tion.8 7 Third, based on the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the fact that
the Dombrowski defendants all acted within the scope of their author-
ity,88 some courts have stated that plurality is established if any of the
corporate agents acted outside the scope of his or her authority.
8 9
regarding the constitutionality of applying § 1985(3) to private conspiracies, see Intracorpo-
rate Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 485-86 n.90, or from the unthinking application of rules
of plurality developed in the context of antitrust laws to the field of civil rights. Id at 479.
These suggestions are not convincing. The constitutionality of the application of
§ 1985(3) was settled by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971), and suggestions of continuing fears seem far-fetched. The suggestion that
the circuit courts are applying antitrust precedents unthinkingly to civil rights cases gives far
less credit to the courts than they deserve. Thus, the only truly plausible explanation for the
Dombrowski rule would seem to be judicial concern over expansion of the scope of
§ 1985(3).
82. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971); McClellan v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 940 (5th Cir. 1977) (Godbold, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally Note, The Scope of Section 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L.
Rv. 239, 251-52 (1977); Intracorporate Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 484-85.
83. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
84. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196.
85. Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see also Aungst
v. J.C. Penney Co., 456 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
86. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196.
87. Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
88. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 193 ("Sine ... [both individuals] acted within the scope
of their authority as agents for that firm, it is open to question whether the conspiracy re-
quirement of § 1985(3) has been met.").
89. This exception was first implied in Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d
66, 71-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976), and then explicitly adopted in Hodgin
v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1978) (unauthorized acts of officials do not
constitute corporate action and hence cannot avoid a conspiracy charge); see also Cole v.
University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1975).
This exception has created a dilemma. IfWall agents act within the scope of their author-
ity, there is no plurality and the corporation is not liable. On the other hand, if all agents
exceed the scope of their authority, the doctrine of respondeat superior provides that the
corporation is not responsible for the agents' acts. Thus, if all the agents stick together and
act either exclusively within or exclusively outside their scope of authority, the corporation is
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As the exceptions to Dombrowski indicate, the courts are willing to
find that the plurality of persons required for conspiracy under section
1985(3) exists in an intracorporate context. Moreover, in a recent deci-
sion, the Third Circuit reinterpreted the plurality requirement of sec-
tion 1985(3). Instead of invoking Dombrowski or an exception to it, the
Third Circuit abandoned Dombrowski altogether in Novotny v. Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association9" and concluded that
agents of a single corporation can compose the plurality required for a
civil rights conspiracy. 91
In Novotny, the plaintiff sued his former employer, Great Ameri-
can Federal Savings & Loan Association, and nine individual officers
and directors of the corporation. The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendants were liable under section 1985(3) because they had fired him
after he had defended a female employee who alleged that the corpora-
tion discriminated against her because of her sex. The district court
dismissed the section 1985(3) claim on the basis that the defendants
had committed only a single act of "business entity" discrimination
against the plaintiff, and this was insufficient to establish a claim under
section 1985(3).92 The court relied on Dombrowski for the proposition
that, if only a single act of discrimination by a single entity is involved,
the fact that two or more agents participated will not create a conspir-
acy under section 1985(3).93
immune. See generally The Impact of Novotny, supra note 54, at 609 n.81; Intracorporate
Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 475.
The Seventh Circuit, explaining its rationale in Dombrowski, stated that agents acting
within their scope of authority could not always avoid a conspiracy finding and gave this
example: "Agents of the Klan certainly could not carry out acts of violence with impunity
simply because they were acting under orders from the Grand Dragon." Dombrowski, 459
F.2d at 196. A potential fourth exception, based on this language, providing that the Dom-
browski rule would not apply to racially motivated acts of violence, never has been accepted
by any court and has been specifically rejected by one. Cole v. University of Hartford, 391
F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975) (involving discriminatory practices, not violence). Never-
theless, if the Seventh Circuit's reference to the Klan has any meaning, it might be inter-
preted to create an exception for racially motivated acts of violence.
As it is unlikely that a corporate agent who commits a racially motivated act of violence
also acts within the scope of his or her employment to further a corporation's legitimate
purpose, a corporate agent falling under the exception for racially motivated acts of violence
probably would also fall under the exception of acting beyond the scope of his or her author-
ity. Plurality could be established on the latter basis.
90. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442
U.S. 366 (1979).
91. Id at 1257-59.
92. 430 F. Supp. 227, 230 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
93. Id. at 229-30. The plaintiff attempted to rely on Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F.
Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974), which held that continuing instances of discrimination and har-
assment constituted more than a single act of discrimination by a single business entity, thus
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Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit held that the officers
of a single corporation did establish the plurality required for conspir-
acy under section 1985(3). The court began by noting that section
1985(3) on its face requires only that "two or more persons" conspire in
order for the statute to apply.94 The court noted that there was no basis
in the legislative history of section 1985(3) for the argument that multi-
ple employees of a company do not constitute a plurality. The court
framed the issue not as whether a corporation can conspire with itself,
but whether the individual officers and employees of a corporation are
capable of conspiring within the meaning of section 1985(3).
The court found that the argument that employees of a single cor-
poration do not constitute a plurality conflicts with the "general tenets
of conspiracy theory. ' 95 Analogizing the situation to the "well-estab-
lished line of precedent" finding a plurality in criminal conspiracy
cases, the court distinguished the no-plurality rule of antitrust law as
reflecting considerations unique to antitrust law and inapposite to sec-
tion 1985(3).96 The Third Circuit thus found no basis in precedent or
policy for holding that agents of a single corporation cannot establish
the plurality required for a civil rights conspiracy, and held that the
agents did constitute the "two or more persons" required for violation
of section 1985(3).
The majority position-that agents of a single corporation do not
constitute a plurality capable of conspiracy under section 1985(3)-is a
manifestation of the courts' desire to limit section 1985(3).97 If the ma-
jority rule is not followed, a corporation can be held liable under sec-
tion 1985(3) whenever two or more of its employees act to deprive an
individual of his or her civil rights. Such an individual would have a
private right of action. The Dombrowski rule in effect limits the poten-
tial for expansion of section 1985(3) into a federal tort law. The major-
ity rule therefore is not based on requirements of conspiracy law, but
instead reflects a concern related exclusively to section 1985(3).98
making Dombrowski inapplicable. The court noted, however, that although the complaint
described numerous acts of discrimination by the defendant against women employees,
Novotny himself had suffered only one act of discrimination, his termination. 430 F. Supp.
at 230.
94. 584 F.2d at 1257. Although accurate, this statement is not enlightening because it
merely represents the same question as one of statutory construction: whether each individ-
ual is a "person" so that there are two or more persons involved, or whether the only "per-
son" involved is the corporation, acting through multiple agents.
95. Id
96. Id at 1258 n.121.
97. See note 82 supra.
98. The majority rule has been criticized as unpersuasive, Intracorporate Conspiracies,
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Corporations and Criminal Conspiracy
Historically, corporations were held immune from criminal liabil-
ity99 for a number of reasons.1 0° Foremost among these was the re-
quirement for all common law crimes that the actor have a mens rea, a
criminal intent to commit the particular crime. As a corporation is a
fictional entity, it was viewed as incapable of entertaining any such in-
supra note 38, at 485, analytically defective, id at 477, and inexplicable from a policy stand-
point, TheImpact of Novotny, supra note 54, at 618 (majority rule and exceptions are based
on "uncertain distinctions and a dearth of reasoned policy"). One commentator has argued
in favor of abandoning the Dombrowski approach altogether and adopting the minority
view articulated in Novotny. The Impact of Novotny, supra note 54, at 619. Another com-
mentator has stated that, to the extent that the majority position reflects judicial concern that
§ 1985(3) be limited, the limitation could be better imposed through requirements directly
related to substantive civil rights law than through an artificial or unwieldy definition of
plurality. Conspiracies Under 42 U.SC. § 1985(c), supra note 38, at 485 ("A more defensible
limitation, implicit in the statute and made explicit by the Supreme Court in Breckenridge, is
the requirement that the discrimination be based not on personal antipathy toward the
plaintiff but upon prejudice against a class defined by invidious criteria.") (footnote
omitted).
99. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 ("[A] corporation cannot commit
treason, or felony, or other crime, in [its] corporate capacity; though [its] other members
may, in their distinct individual capacities."). American courts took the same position. See,
e.g., Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel Steam Mill Co., 64 Me. 441 (1875) (penalty
for theft of logs inapplicable to corporation). See generally Edgerton, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 827-28 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Edgerton]; Miller, Cor-
porate Criminal Liability: .4 Principle Extended to its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49, 50 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Miller]; Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60
HARV. L. REV. 283 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Liability].
100. One rationale for corporate immunity from criminal liability was the theory that
criminal acts by agents of the corporation were ultra vires and therefore not imputable to the
corporation. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788
(1943); F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE COMMON
LAW 126 (6th ed. 1929); Edgerton, supra note 99, at 829; Stone, supra note 61, at 3 n. 14. The
ultra vires defense has long been discarded. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co.,
358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (partnerships can be guilty of willful violations of regulatory stat-
utes); New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (corpora-
tions can be guilty of willful violations of regulatory statutes); see also Edgerton, supra note
99, at 839 ("[C]ourts have had to abandon at various points the old notion that ultra vires
action is impossible. Ultra vires torts and ultra vires transfers of property create rights and
liabilities. There is no reason for a distinction in this respect between torts and crimes.").
Additionally, some cases had suggested that the word "person" in criminal statutes did
not include corporations. See, e.g., State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611 (1874).
See generally Edgerton, supra note 99, at 830. Today, however, it is clear that a corporation
is a "person" within the scope of criminal statutes. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (the words "persons"
and "whoever" include corporations unless context indicates otherwise); see United States v.
Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909).
For a list of federal statutes under which corporations may be liable, see STAFF MEMO-
RANDA ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ARTIFI-
CIAL ENTITIES: SECTIONS 402-406 in WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 163, 207 app. (1970).
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tent.101 Today, however, a corporation can possess the requisite mens
rea. 1
02
The traditional view first was discarded in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury in cases involving strict liability crimes or civil offenses, in which
no mens rea was required.103 This distinction was later abandoned,
and the mens rea of the corporation's agent was imputed to the corpo-
ration under the theory of respondeat superior.1l 4 In all jurisdictions
today a corporation can be held liable for a crime. 10 5
There is, however, some dispute about the scope of this liability. 0 6
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 323, 153 S.W. 459,
460-61 (1913); Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward, [1902] 2 K.B. 1, 11. See generally
Edgerton, supra note 99, at 828-29; Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L.
REV. 21, 22-23 (1957) (overview of the development of corporate criminal liability) [herein-
after cited as Mueller]; Stone, supra note 61, at 3 (evaluation of the present method ofjudg-
ig corporate wrongdoing).
102. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1906). See
generally Edgerton, supra note 99, at 828 & n. 11.
103. See, e.g., State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 364 (1852) (corporation may
be liable for misfeasance). See generally 2 V. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 733, at 702 (2d ed. 1886) ("[When] the crime consists of the act
alone, without regard to the intention with which it was committed;... there is no difficulty
in attributing an offence of this character to a corporation, since it may be committed en-
tirely through the company's agents."); Edgerton, supra note 99, at 832-36, 840-44 (arguing
in support of corporate criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime- Reg-
ulating Corporate .Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1246 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Corporate Crime].
104. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Near-
ing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). See generally Seventh Circuit Instructions § 5.03(a),
Committee Comment (corporations liable through "application of respondeat superior prin-
ciples to criminal statutes"); Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1246-51;
Comment, Is Corporate CriminalLiability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 908-17 (1975);
Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 870, 871-72 (1973).
105. See Stone, supra note 61, at 7-8. See generally Comment, Is Corporate Criminal
Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 912-13 & n.30 (1975) (noting that every state
has adopted corporate criminal liability); Edgerton, supra note 99, at 832-36 (law has moved
from narrow views of corporate criminal responsibility towards broad views); Mueller, supra
note 101, at 22 ("[Fjrom position that corporation could not possibly incur criminal liability
... the law has moved rapidly to the stand that a corporation can be guilty of most, if not
all, crimes."); Criminal Liability, supra note 99 (analyzing whether a corporation should be
liable for all crimes committed by its agents).
106. A majority of jurisdictions provide that a corporation is liable for the acts of its
agents if the agent commits a crime within the scope of employment and with the intent to
benefit the corporation. This standard of liability, based on the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, is the current common law rule in the federal courts. New York Cent. & Hudson River
R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909); United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563
F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946). See generally STAFF MEMORANDA ON RESPONSIBIL-
ITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES: SECTIONS
402-406 in WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The corporation generally is liable for the acts of its agents if the agent
was acting in behalf of the corporation10 7 and within the scope of his or
her employment. 0 8 Moreover, the individual agent remains personally
liable for the crime, notwithstanding the imposition of liability upon
the corporation.10 9
CRIMINAL LAWS 163, 169 n.8 (1970); Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at
1247. This same standard of respondeat superior is adopted in the proposed federal criminal
code. See Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Finally, this
standard has been adopted by a majority of states. See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fi-
nance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 280, 275 N.E.2d 33, 86, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1971). See
generally Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1247.
In contrast, a number of states have largely adopted the Model Penal Code's approach
to corporate liability. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-4 (1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 20.20 (McKinney 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 307 (Purdon 1973). The Model
Penal Code imposes vicarious liability on corporations, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962); see Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1251-53,
but limits liability in two significant ways. First, the corporation is not always liable for the
acts of subordinate agents; under some circumstances, corporate liability is limited to acts
authorized or recklessly tolerated by a high managerial agent. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Second, in some situations the corporation can
defend against a criminal charge by demonstrating that a high managerial agent acted with
due diligence to prevent the criminal act. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(a), (c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); United States
v. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1168 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962). The requirement that the agent be acting in behalf of the corpora-
tion is sometimes expressed in terms of the agent's intent to benefit the corporation. See,
e.g., id. at 128 ("the purpose to benefit the corporation is decisive in terms of equating the
agent's action with that of the corporation"); Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note
103, at 1250; Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 870, 874-75 (1973).
Whether expressed as a requirement that the agent be acting "in behalf of" the corporation
or "with the intent to benefit" the corporation, the concept is the same: the agent must be
acting with intent to further the corporate interest. See generally Miller, supra note 99, at 59-
61; Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1247-53.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(a), (c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Shumate &
Co. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 509 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-
05 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
Although the Model Penal Code generally requires that the agent be acting "in behalf
of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment" in order for the corporation
to be liable, an exception is made for strict liability crimes and crimes based on an omission
to discharge a specific duty. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(b), (2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962). See generally Developments-Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1251-53.
109. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962); United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177, 179
(7th Cir. 1945); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See generally
STAFF MEMORANDA ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES: SECTIONS 402-406 in WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 163, 207-08 (1970); Developments-
Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1244; Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 Nw. U.L.
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For the purpose of analyzing the plurality requirement of criminal
conspiracy laws, the crucial feature of corporate liability is the principle
of vicarious liability.110 The corporation is never an actual participant
in any crime. Rather, when the required agency relationship is demon-
strated," ' the corporation will be held liable for the conduct of its
agents." 2 The vicarious nature of corporate criminal liability often is
overlooked," 13 and should be emphasized to avoid confusion in analyz-
ing plurality standards."
4
REV. 870, 884-85 (1973); Note, Individual LiabiliAy ofAgents/or Crimes Under the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 31 VAND. L. REv. 965 (1978).
110. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 231(1972) ("corporate criminal
liability is a form of vicarious liability"); Fisse, The Distinction Between Primary and Vicari-
ous Corporate CriminalLiability, 41 AUSTL L.J. 203, 205 (1967); Miller, supra note 99, at 49
n.3; CriminalLiabiiy, supra note 99.
111. See note 106 supra.
112. Several commentators argue that respondeat superior as a doctrine of vicarious lia-
bility was designed to serve the goals of tort law and is inappropriate as a rule of criminal
law. See Miller, supra note 99, at 68 ("Blindly applying tort principles of respondeat superior
in the criminal context will only undermine the complex and difficult task of insuring corpo-
rate compliance with the law."); Mueller, supra note 101, at 39 ("The growth of corporate
criminal liability was fostered by analogies from the law of torts. Many courts simply failed
to appreciate any material difference between the two bodies of law."); Criminal Liability,
supra note 99, at 285 ("[S]hifting of the burden of loss to consumers, which is a principal
justification of respondeat superior in the law of torts, has no application in the criminal
law."). But see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE
L.J. 1091, 1096 (1976): "[TMort analogy may be a misleading guide for determining entity
liability [because it] overlooks the different policy considerations underlying criminal and
civil penalties. In particular, although both criminal and civil law are concerned with deter-
ring undesirable conduct, only the latter is concerned with compensating injured parties."
Cf Edgerton, supra note 99, at 835-36: "Why should a distinction be made between the
criminal and the civil responsibility of a corporation for the acts of its agents? . ... What
differences are there between crimes and torts which require or justify a narrower corporate
responsibility for crimes than for tort? . . . The supposed difference in nature between
crimes and torts is a difference in emphasis or point of view on the one hand, and in proce-
dure on the other."
Several commentators have noted that, when respondeat superior is applied in a crimi-
nal context, one major anomaly has evolved. A principal who is a natural person is not
criminally liable for the acts the agent committed without the principal's authorization, con-
sent, or knowledge. In contrast, a principal who is a corporation is liable for the acts of its
agents regardless of its lack of authorization or knowledge. See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 231; Criminal Liability, supra note 99, at 284-86.
113. "mhe common law has long ceased thinking in terms of vicarious liability every
time a corporation is said to breach the law and is convicted." Mueller, supra note 101, at
40.
114. The potential availability of either or both of two defendants--the individual and
the corporation, see note 109 supra-has raised issues in other areas as well. One issue is the
potential of abuse by the prosecution. See Stone, supra note 61, at 30 n.l19.
The major problem* has been inconsistency of verdicts. Juries have sometimes con-
victed the corporation but acquitted the individuals. This result is anomalous because, to
convict the corporation, the jury must have found the individuals guilty. Although con-
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Principles of Criminal Conspiracy
Criminal conspiracy is not easily defined." 5 In the federal sys-
tem," 6 the crime of conspiracy is codified in one general conspiracy
statute" 7 and numerous miscellaneous statutes. 1 8 These statutes are
skeletal, however, so the courts have defined and developed the law of
cemed with the issue, federal courts do not require consistency in verdicts. See, e.g., Magno-
lia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950, 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
815 (1959): United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.) cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941). See generally Miller, supra note 99, at 52 n.22; Developments-Corpo-
rate Crime, supra note 103, at 1249; Note, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 Nw. U.L. REV.
870, 875-76 (1973); Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85
YALE L.J. 1091, 1096-97 n.27 (1976); Note, Increasing Community Control over Corporate
Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 292 n.50 (1961).
One commentator who favors abolishing corporate criminal liability altogether has ar-
gued that, if corporate liability were abolished, "Juries would no longer act so erratically
because they would not have to choose between corporate and individual liability." Com-
ment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 927 (1975). This
argument is misleading because juries are not required to choose; corporate and individual
liability are complementary, not mutually exclusive. See note 114 supra; Developments-
Corporate Crime, supra note 103, at 1244.
115. "The modem crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted); see also Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624 (1941) ("In
the long category of crimes there is none. . . more difficult to confine within the boundaries
of definitive statement than conspiracy.") (footnote omitted); Sayre, supra note 2, at 398
(conspiracy is a doctrine "vague in its outlines"); Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra
note 2, at 922 (discussing the substantive and procedural "formlessness" of criminal
conspiracy).
116. This discussion emphasizes criminal conspiracy in the federal system because the
majority of conspiracy prosecutions are brought in the federal system; state prosecutors
rarely use the conspiracy laws. See Marcus, Conspiracy" The CriminalAgreement in Theory
and in Practice, 65 GEo. L.J. 925, 946-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Marcus]. While con-
spiracy is one of the most commonly charged crimes in the federal system, it is rarely
charged in state systems for two reasons: first, state prosecutors primarily adjudicate local,
violent crime, leaving to the federal prosecutors the more sophisticated interstate crimes that
involve conspiracies; second, state prosecutors often lack the resources necessary to prose-
cute intricate schemes. Id
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976): "If two or more persons conspire either to commit an
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
118. Title 18 includes 26 other conspiracy statutes directed at specific conduct. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 224 (1976) (conspiracy to fix sporting contests); id § 241 (1976) (conspiracy to
intimidate citizen exercising constitutional rights); id § 658 (1976) (conspiracy to defraud
secured creditors); id § 1201(c) (1976) (conspiracy to kidnap).
Conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws is also a crime. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1976). Although antitrust conspiracies are criminal, they are considered separately
throughout this Article, and are not included in the term "criminal conspiracy."
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criminal conspiracy." 9 Although criminal conspiracy is an elusive
concept, 20 it can be defined as an agreement between two or more per-
sons 121 to commit a crime and an overt act by one of them in further-
ance of the agreement.'
22
Many reasons have been advanced for defining conspiracy as a
crime.123 Criminal liability for this inchoate or preparatory offense is
premised on two elements: mens rea is found in the conspirators'
agreement to commit a crime, 24 and the required actus reus 125 is found
in the first overt act in carrying out that agreement.' 26 Thus, the of-
fense of conspiracy allows official intervention after a sufficiently defi-
nite expression of intent, but before the commission of the substantive
crime that constitutes the goal of the conspiracy.
127
119. See Marcus, supra note 116, at 926 n.4 (noting that important Supreme Court deci-
sions alone are numerous); Marcus, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy Provi-
sions, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 379, 383 (the federal conspiracy offense has been defined by
"literally thousands of reported decisions"); see also Developments-Criminal Conspiracy,
supra note 2, at 923 (conspiracy in such a highly generalized form could only have devel-
oped in system of judge-made law).
120. For a summary of the significant current conflicts in authority as to the elements of
criminal conspiracy, see note 149 infra.
121. To qualify as a conspiracy, at least two persons must be involved. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1976); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934). The term "person"' includes
corporations. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
122. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); United States v. Isaacs, 516
F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 936 (1975).
123. Criminal conspiracy is a difficult concept to justify as well as to define. According
to one commentator, there are basic "conceptual difficulties involved in any attempt to ex-
plain the underlying theory of conspiracy and to relate this theory to generally applicable
principles of criminal law." Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 922.
124. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, com-
ment at 97 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1157 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson]; Marcus, supra note 116, at
929.
125. Criminal liability is not imposed unless the defendant has committed an act. See,
e.g., Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). This require-
ment of an actus reus ensures that defendants are punished only for what they do and not for
what they think. Id at 543-44. See generally PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 74 (1968).
126. See, e.g., United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1975) (conspiracy is not
punishable as state of mind and becomes punishable only if accompanied by an overt act);
United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1972) (essential element of overt act is impor-
tant in demonstrating more than subjective mental intent); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280
(9th Cir. 1959) (function of overt act is to show that conspiracy has progressed from field of
thought and talk into action).
127. The inchoate crime of conspiracy has been criticized as unnecessary in view of the
law of attempt. Johnson, supra note 124, at 1161-64 (inchoate conspiracy unnecessary with
Model Penal Code definition of attempt); Marcus, supra note 116, at 932 (general attempt
statute could readily handle the inchoate aspect of most conspiracy offenses).
1179
This "early intervention" rationale is one justification for charging
the crime of conspiracy when that offense is inchoate.12 8 In the federal
system, however, conspiracy does not merge when the substantive
crime has been achieved. 129 Once the substantive crime is complete,
the primary justification for the charge is that collective action presents
a greater risk to society than individual action and so warrants punish-
ment in addition to that imposed for the substantive crime. 130 Collec-
tive action is said to be more dangerous for several reasons. First, the
chances of harm to society increase as a result of group action because
more participants make it more likely that the criminal object will be
achieved.' 3' Second, what harm society suffers will be greater because
the involvement of multiple participants allows increased efficiency
through division of labor and achievement of more complex criminal
objects. 3 2 Third, an individual defendant involved in a conspiracy is
less likely to quit the criminal enterprise 133 because the individuals pro-
vide each other with mutual support and encouragement. 134 Fourth, a
conspiracy makes it less likely that the object crime will be detected. 135
Fifth, apart from the increased dangers related to the specific object of
the conspiracy, 36 a conspiracy provides a focal point for the commis-
128. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 1157 ("almost the only justification offered by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code for retaining the offense [of conspiracy] was the need to
punish groups which engage in preparatory conduct").
129. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
130. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 593 (1961); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). See generally Goldstein,
Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413 (1959) (discussing the group
danger rationale) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein]; Developments-Criminal Conspiracy,
supra note 2, at 923-25 (same).
131. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Greer, 476
F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973); Developments--Criminal
Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 924.
132. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J.); Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. at 448 (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 766
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
133. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J.).
134. Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 924.
135. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); Goldstein, supra note 130, at
413.
136. The authors of Developments-Criminal Conspiracy classify the arguments in favor
of conspiracy into two general categories: the "specific object" rationale, which focuses on
the dangers of conspiracy related to the likelihood that the conspirators will achieve the
specific object of the conspiracy, and the "general danger" rationale, which focuses on dan-
gers presented by conspiracy unrelated to its specific object. See generally Developments-
Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 925.
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sion of additional crimes unrelated to the initial object. 137 Sixth, a
group endeavor provides each member with an education in crime.
138
Finally, the existence of a conspiracy produces antisocial effects be-
cause the knowledge that such groups exist makes the public uneasy.
139
These justifications, however, have never been proved empirically, and
there is substantial disagreement regarding their validity.140
Although criminal conspiracy is difficult to define and there is lit-
tle consensus on the validity of the underlying assumptions, the effect
of a conspiracy charge is immense. 141 Conspiracy functions both as an
inchoate or preparatory crime and as a substantive offense. As an in-
choate crime, conspiracy allows police intervention before the object of
the conspiracy is achieved. 142 Yet, if the substantive offense is com-
pleted, the defendants remain liable for conspiracy along with the sub-
stantive offense. 143 Moreover, conspiracy is a basis for imposing
137. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. at 593-94; Steele v. State, 151 A.2d 127, 131
(Del. 1959); Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 924-25.
138. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88; Goldstein, supra note 130, at 413.
139. Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 925.
140. These rationales are merely the suppositions of legislators, judges, and commenta-
tors. There is disagreement about whether conspiracy is more dangerous than individual
action. In contrast to the explanations of why group action is more dangerous, one commen-
tator suggests that group action actually may be less dangerous. "[T]here is as much reason
to believe that a large number of participants will increase the prospect that the plan will be
leaked as that it will be kept secret; or that the persons involved will share their uncertainties
and dissuade each other as that each will stiffen the others' determination. Most probably,
however, the factors ordinarily mentioned as warranting the crime of conspiracy would be
found to add to the danger to be expected from a group in certain situations and not in
others: the goals of the group and the personalities of the members would make any gener-
alization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for treating conspiracy as a sepa-
rate crime in all cases." Goldstein, supra note 130, at 414. This conclusion that group action
is not always more dangerous than individual action and depends on the fact situation is
today shared by many lawyers involved with the crime of conspiracy. In a survey conducted
by Professor Marcus, the majority of respondents felt that conspiracy did not per se result in
either greater or lesser danger to society, but that it depended on the specific fact situation.
Marcus, supra note 116, at 934 (76.3% of respondents felt degree of danger depended on
facts).. Professor Marcus agreed with this conclusion. Id at 966 ("group behavior is not
always more dangerous than individual behavior").
141. Most of the ramifications of a conspiracy count are beneficial for the prosecutor,
not for the defendant. Recognizing this, Justice Learned Hand characterized conspiracy as
"that darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259,
263 (2d Cir. 1925).
142. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975); United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532, 542, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 785 (1947); United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d. 305,
310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974) (crime of conspiracy is complete with agree-
ment to violate the law and one overt act and does not depend on the outcome of the
planned scheme).
143. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961); Beitel v. United States, 306 F.2d
665, 670 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Parnes, 210 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1954).
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accomplice liability, rendering each member of the conspiracy liable
for foreseeable crimes committed by all other members in furtherance
of the conspiracy.4
Despite the vagueness of its definition and the disagreement about
its justifications, the crime of conspiracy has enormous effect in many
areas 45 and is controversial. 146 There is controversy regarding the the-
ories justifying defining conspiracy as a crime, 14 7 the several independ-
ent procedural doctrines triggered by the crime, 148 and the fundamental
elements of a conspiracy.149 In general, criminal conspiracy is a con-
144. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); United States v. Tilton, 610
F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 1980) (party to a continuing conspiracy can be held responsible for
substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators if such acts were committed in further-
ance of conspiracy, although the defendants neither participated in the acts nor actually
knew about them).
145. The history of criminal conspiracy reflects a constant expansion of liability. Justice
Cardozo stated that criminal conspiracy illustrates the "tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 51
(1921), quoted in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., with
Frankfurter and Murphy, J.J., concurring).
146. A doctrine "so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as
criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand of
shifting opinion and ill-considered thought." Sayre, supra note 2, at 393 (footnote omitted);
see also Marcus, supra note 116, at 926 (noting extensive analysis in law review articles and
reported cases); Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 922 (noting wide-
spread criticism from judicial and law review commentators).
147. See notes 127-40 & accompanying text supra.
148. See generally Johnson, supra note 124, at 1164-88. First, under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, testimony of a co-conspirator against the defendant that would otherwise be
hearsay is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). To
come within this exception, the statement must be made during the course of and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. Id; see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949). Sec-
ond, a charge of conspiracy broadens considerably the appropriate venue for trial, because a
conspirator may be tried in the district in which any conspirator committed an overt act or in
the district in which the agreement was made. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912);
United States v. Boswell, 372 F.2d 781 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 919 (1967). See
generally Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 975-78. Third, conspiracy
almost automatically allows the joinder of defendants at trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). See
generally Johnson, supra note 124, at 1166-75. Finally, a conspiracy count in effect extends
the statute of limitations because the statute does not begin to run until the date of the last
overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S.
211, 216 (1946); United States v. Fitzgerald, 579 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1002 (1979); United States v. Boyle, 338 F. Supp. 1028 (D.D.C. 1972). An overt act that
would be barred by the statute of limitations if prosecuted as a separate offense can still be
proved at trial as an overt act pursuant to a conspiracy. United States v. Portner, 462 F.2d
678 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); United States v. Smith, 412 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Although the defendant could not be convicted of the offenses barred by
the statute of limitations, it would prejudice his or her position for the earlier crimes to be
presented to the jury.
149. Controversy regarding the basic elements of a criminal conspiracy centers today on
three questions. The first question is whether the conspiratorial agreement must be bilateral
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fused area of the law. 150
One area of particular confusion in conspiracy law is the question
of what constitutes the required plurality in an intracorporate situation.
Generally, when an agent acting within the scope of employment com-
mits a crime on behalf of a corporation, both the agent and the corpo-
ration may be held liable for the substantive crime. If the agent and
the corporation are deemed to be a plurality, they may also be held
or whether a unilateral agreement is sufficient. The current federal position requires a bilat-
eral agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) ("if two or more persons conspire"); see Morrison v.
California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934). The position of the proposed federal criminal code is not
clear. See Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DEPAUL L. REv.
75, 82-83 (1979); Marcus, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy Provisions, 1978
U. ILL. L.F. 379, 385-86. The Model Penal Code adopted the unilateral theory, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and 30 states have followed that ap-
proach. See Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DEPAUL L.
REv. 75, 75-76 n.3 (1979).
The second question is whether an overt act is a material element of a criminal conspir-
acy. The current general federal conspiracy statute and the proposed federal conspiracy
provision both require an overt act. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) ("and one or more...
persons do any act to effect the object of the'conspiracy"); S. 1437 and H.R. 6869, § 1002(a)
("one of such persons... engages in any conduct"). See generally Marcus, The Proposed
Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy Provisions, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 379, 386-87. The Model
Penal Code also requires an overt act. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). Only about half the states, however, currently require proof of an overt act.
See Burgman, Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 75,
101 & n.153 (1979).
The third question is whether the object of the conspiracy must be a crime. The current
federal statute is not limited to conspiracies whose object is a crime; it prohibits conspiracies
"either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States
... ." 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); see also United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1970)
(§ 371 "punishes a conspiracy to defraud although the fraud may not constitute a substan-
tive offense"); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 958 (1969) (§ 371 prohibits conspiracies having as their purpose the impairing, ob-
structing or defeating of the lawful function of any government department). See generally
Goldstein, supra note 130. The proposed federal criminal code would change the law and
limit the definition of a conspiracy to an agreement whose object is itself a crime. See S.
1437 and H.R. 6869 § 1002(a) ("A person is guilty of an offense if he agrees with one or
more persons to engage in conduct, the performance of which would constitute a crime or
crimes ... ."). See generally Marcus, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Conspiracy
Provisions, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 379, 383. The Model Penal Code also limits the definition of
conspiracy to agreements to commit a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962). Many states, in contrast, allow conspiracy prosecutions to reach agree-
ments to commit any act injurious to public health, morals, trade or commerce. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(5) (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1(f) (1972). See generally
Marcus, supra note 116, at 963-65; Sayre, supra note 2, at 405-06.
150. The confusion surrounding conspiracy has been recognized by two leading conspir-
acy scholars. Johnson, supra note 124, at 1139 ("What conspiracy adds to the law is simply
confusion, and the confusion is inherent in the nature of the doctrine."); Marcus, supra note
116, at 967 ("Until the charge of criminal conspiracy is curbed, the conspiracy doctrine will
remain the source of considerable confusion.. ").
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liable for conspiracy. 151 In a situation in which multiple agents acting
within the scope of employment conspire to commit a crime on behalf
of a corporation, both the agents and corporation are liable for the sub-
stantive crime. If the agents are defined as a plurality, the agents and
the corporation also might be liable for conspiracy.
Plurality Under the Criminal Conspiracy Laws
Courts 5 2 and commentators 153 have suggested that criminal con-
spiracy can be found within a single corporation, at least when several
agents of that corporation are involved. Decisions continue to con-
flict, 154 however, and it has been observed that the law remains unset-
tled. 55 The law of conspiratorial plurality is difficult to decipher both
because of liberal pleading and proof requirements 156 and because the
151. This is true in the federal system because the crime of conspiracy does not merge
into the substantive crime. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
152. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1258 (3d
Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) ("well-
established line of precedent" indicates that, apart from antitrust area in which corporation
commits a substantive crime, officers who caused corporation to act are liable for criminal
conspiracy).
153. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 324 (1977) ("where corporation commits a sub-
stantive crime, the officers and directors who caused it to act are guilty of criminal conspir-
acy"); ATT'Y GEN., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 30 (1955) ("It has long been the law that where a corporation commits a substantive
crime, the officers and directors who participated in the illicit venture are guilty of criminal
conspiracy.").
154. Compare United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D.
Va. July 6, 1976) (five individual employees and the corporation did not constitute a plural-
ity) with United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (plural-
ity may be established by employees and their employer-corporation).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio
1976). The court stated that it had not found any case that "analyzed the precise question"
before it, that is, the existence of plurality between several employees of a single corporation
and the corporation. Id at 580.
156. Determining whether the plurality requirement of conspiracy is satisfied is particu-
larly difficult in the criminal law because of conspiracy pleading rules. First, the defendant's
co-conspirators need not be charged; a single individual may be convicted of conspiring with
persons named in the indictment as co-conspirators although only the defendant was in-
dicted. United States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1976); Ng Pui Yu v. United States,
352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965). This rule is sound because the government should be allowed
to exercise its discretion about whom to charge. But it is not even necessary that the co-
conspirators be identified in the indictment; a single defendant may be convicted when the
indictment refers to unidentified co-conspirators. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375
(1951); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1947); United States v. Booty, 621
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980). This rule is reflected in the language included in most conspiracy
indictments to the effect that the defendant conspired with "others known and unknown" to
the grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1979) ("others known and unknown"). Such language generally is
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courts that have addressed the issue frequently have not been explicit
in their reasoning.
157
Conspiracy Between a Single Agent and the Corporation
Whether a single agent and his or her corporate employer can con-
stitute a conspiratorial plurality first was considered in United States v.
Santa lita Store Co. 158 In Santa Rita, four defendants were indicted
for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.159 The four defendants in-
cluded two companies, the Santa Rita Mining Company and the Santa
Rita Store Company, and two individuals: Deegan, the general agent
in charge of both companies, and Young, an employee of both compa-
nies. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiracy to force
employees and tenants of the two companies to trade with them exclu-
sively by threatening the loss of their jobs and leases.
After trial, the two individual defendants were acquitted and the
two companies convicted.1 60 The companies moved for a judgment of
acquittal, arguing that conspiracy was legally impossible due to lack of
plurality. The court held that there was no conspiracy "because of a
included in the indictment even where the chances of a failure of plurality are remote. See,
e.g., United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (conspiracy to violate RICO)
(indictment identified 43 conspirators of whom six were indicted; nonetheless, indictment
also referred to "others to the grand jury known and unknown").
The result is that a single defendant may be convicted of conspiracy if the indictment
alleges the existence of unknown co-conspirators. United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630
F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1974). As courts
are often not as meticulous as they might be in recounting the specific allegations of the
indictment, it frequently is impossible to determine whether there were unknown conspira-
tors involved and if so, whether the court relied on them to establish plurality. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), discussed in text accompanying notes
170-72 infra.
157. See United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), discussed in text
accompanying notes 162-69 infra. The court in Carroll, faced with a criminal conspiracy
case involving a corporation and a single agent, relied on antitrust and civil conspiracy
precedents, and failed to distinguish the case before it from cases on which it relied that
involved multiple agents. In United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 173-75 infra, the court failed to indicate clearly whether
the conspiracy conviction was based on a plurality made up of the corporation and the
single, named agent, or whether other individuals, not named as defendants but nonetheless
involved, were relied on to find a plurality.
158. 16 N.M. 3, 113 P. 620 (1911).
159. Although this case involved a criminal antitrust conspiracy rather than a general
criminal conspiracy, the court resolved the plurality question by reference to general princi-
ples of riminal law and did not invoke any principles unique to antitrust law. Thus, the
case is more appropriate to a discussion of general conspiracy law than to antitrust law.
160. This pattern of convicting the companies while acquitting the individual results so
frequently that it has become a subject of controversy. See note 114 supra.
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lack of persons," 161 first recounting that there was no evidence that
anyone other than Deegan was involved in the criminal acts, and then
stating that a conspiracy could not exist between two companies when
the liability of both is established by a single agent; there must be at
least two minds to constitute a conspiracy.
A more recent case considering plurality based on the actions of a
single agent is United States v. Carroll.62 The indictment charged the
defendants with misrepresentation and conspiracy to use and acquire
gold in violation of the gold laws. The indictment originally included
five defendants: Sheba Bracelets, Inc. and four individual agents of the
corporation. The government severed the case against two of the indi-
viduals before trial 163 and further dismissed charges against a third in-
dividual at the close of its case. Only two defendants then remained:
the corporation and its sole owner, Carroll.
The government contended that Carroll had conspired with the
corporation. Noting that the corporation was dominated by Carroll,
the court rejected this argument. A conspiracy "between the defendant
Carroll and the business institution he used to carry out his purposes
. . . [w]ould over-extend the fiction of corporate personaity.' 64 Ob-
serving that several antitrust cases had held that a corporation could be
liable as a conspirator, the court distinguished these cases because, in
each, the defendant corporation conspired not with its own employee,
but with either another corporation or with individuals who were not
employees of the defendant corporation. Relying primarily on an anti-
trust case involving multiple agents, Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Mo-
torola, Inc. ,165 the court found that a corporation is not liable as a
conspirator in "situations similar to the facts at hand."'
66
161. 16 N.M. at 9-10, 113 P. at 620. "Undoubtedly, a conspiracy might be formed by
two corporations acting through agents, yet there must be more than one agent or more than
one person actually engaged in the formation of the conspiracy. In this case a conspiracy
was not formed because of a lack of persons. . . . The union of two or more persons, the
conscious participation in the scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable to an unlawful
combination, and it cannot be created by the action of one man alone." Cf Union Pacific
Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909), discussed in text accompanying notes
20-21 supra.
162. 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
163. Id. at 941.
164. Id
165. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953), discussed in text
accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
166. 144 F. Supp. at 942. The court also cited two cases that involved conspiracy
charges based on the acts of a single individual, but neither involved criminal conspiracy.
Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 129 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954) (civil conspiracy);
United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113 P. 620 (1911) (antitrust conspiracy).
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The analysis of the intracorporate conspiracy question in Carroll is
weak for several reasons. First, it is not clear what happened to the two
agents whose cases were severed. The severance of their cases from
Carroll's should have had no impact on their status as Carroll's co-
conspirators. Yet the severed defendants must have been unavailable
to establish the plurality for Carroll's conviction, because the govern-
ment relied on the weaker argument that Carroll conspired with the
corporation. This point was not clarified by the court.
Second, the court failed to distinguish the situation before it, in-
volving just one natural person, from situations involving multiple nat-
ural persons. 167 Moreover, the court's reliance on antitrust and civil
conspiracy precedents 168 was inappropriate, because conspiracy laws in
those areas further goals different from those of the general criminal
law.
In addition, the Carroll court indicated that the corporation was a
sham, dominated and manipulated by its sole owner, Carroll, and fo-
cused on this as the basis for its ruling.169 Limiting the holding in this
fashion is confusing because it suggests that one agent acting alone may
conspire with his or her corporation if the agent does not dominate the
corporation. Such a distinction would lead to anomalous results be-
cause plurality would depend upon the significance of the agent's role
in the corporation, an essentially irrelevant criterion. Thus, although
Carroll does hold that one agent acting alone is not liable for conspir-
ing with the corporation when he or she commits a crime while acting
within the scope of employment, the analysis is somewhat weak.
Two additional cases appear to have decided whether plurality ex-
ists when one agent acting within the scope of employment commits a
crime. Neither case explicitly analyzed the issue, but both implicitly
held that plurality is established in such situations. In the first case,
United States v. Nearing,70 two defendants, Scott Nearing and the
American Socialist Society, were charged with conspiracy to commit
espionage, conspiracy to cause insubordination in the military, and
conspiracy to obstruct recruiting and enlistment in the military. The
defendants contended that a corporation is immune from conspiracy
charges because a corporation is incapable of entertaining a specific
167. The court relied on cases involving multiple agents of a single corporation: State v.
Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 158 A. 797 (1932); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
168. 144 F. Supp. at 942.
169. Id at 941.
170. 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
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criminal intent. The court disagreed, concluding that the acts and in-
tent of corporate agents are imputed to the corporation to render it
liable criminally.
17 1
Although the facts are not clear, Nearing must have been an agent
of the American Socialist Society for his alleged crimes to be imputed
to the society under the principles of corporate liability discussed by the
court. The court does not refer to any other individual being involved
in the conspiracy. Assuming that there were no other conspirators, the
Nearing court found a conspiracy based on the activities of one natural
person who committed a crime as an agent for a corporation and so
became a conspirator with the corporation.
172
Another case that appears to find a conspiracy between an agent
and a corporation is United States v. Lowder.173 The indictment named
one individual, W. Horace Lowder, and six corporations that were
owned by Lowder and his family. 17 4  The seven defendants were
charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States by preventing the
Internal Revenue Service from collecting taxes owed by four of the six
corporations. All the defendants were convicted of conspiracy. 175
Lowder appealed, but did not question whether he and the six cor-
porations established the plurality of parties necessary for a conspiracy.
The facts as recounted by the court do not indicate that any other indi-
vidual was involved. If only one natural person and therefore only one
mind was involved, arguably the conspiracy plurality requirement was
not met. At any rate, the point was not raised, the plurality question
was not addressed or analyzed, and Lowder's conspiracy conviction
was affirmed.
Although Nearing and Lowder appear to find conspiracies based
on the actions of a single agent, the courts did not note whether indi-
viduals other than the defendants were involved, and apparently did
not consider the lack of plurality defense. Although it may be inferred
from these decisions that conspiracy convictions may be based on the
171. Id at 231.
172. The government also charged that "certain unknown persons" were involved in the
conspiracy, and the court referred to acts of the officers of the American Socialist Society.
Id
173. 492 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1974).
174. The Lowder family owned from 11 1/% to 100% of each corporate defendant. The
court characterized the relationship between Lowder and the corporations as an "intimate
connection." Id at 954.
175. The seven defendants also were indicted on two counts for filing false income tax
returns; on these counts, the corporations were acquitted and Lowder was convicted. Id at
955.
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actions of one individual working within the scope of employment, the
decisions did not explicitly establish this proposition. In the other two
cases, Santa Rita and Carroll, however, the courts indicated that only
one individual was involved; these courts did hold that the alleged con-
spiracy failed for lack of plurality.
In general, therefore, when an agent acting alone commits a crime
within the scope of employment, the stronger authority supports the
proposition that a conspiracy does not exist because of a lack of plural-
ity. This result is premised on the presence of only one mind, and on
the notion that a finding of plurality would unreasonably expand the
fiction of corporate personality. The critical question that must be an-
swered by courts faced with this issue is which holding will best further
the stated goals of criminal conspiracy laws.
The primary rationale of conspiracy law is that collective action is
more dangerous to society because both the likelihood and the serious-
ness of harm to society are increased because of the greater power cre-
ated by group action. 176 Arguably, an agent who has access to
corporate resources commands an increased potential for harm; the
corporation magnifies this power just as the assistance of another indi-
vidual would. Under this rationale, the definition of plurality should
include the situation in which an agent commits a crime using corpo-
rate resources. It is difficult to imagine a single natural person conspir-
ing with a corporation, but if assigning liability for such a combination
serves a sound policy, the law perhaps should find a method by which
to implement the policy.177 One possible theory might be that, al-
though only one natural person was involved, that person was acting in
a dual capacity: both as an individual and as an agent of the corpora-
tion. Thus, the corporation could be included as a conspirator acting
through an agent to establish plurality.
176. See notes 123-40 & accompanying text supra.
177. Sayre, supra note 2, at 412: "But the law, which after all exists primarily to achieve
justice and thus to promote social peace and equilibrium, must not be bound down too
arbitrarily by logical or purely analytical considerations any more than by the iron grip of
historical precedents and correctly traced legal genealogies. If the purpose of legal doctrine
is to promote the social security and well-being, they must be examined functionally and
tested by the degree of protection which they afford to social and to individual interests or
rights."
Cf. Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 25 (1928): "But the doc-
trine that an individual, though he does not in any way communicate or act in conjunction
with another mortal soul, may nevertheless by his wrongdoing be abetting or conspiring
with that immortal entity, the corporation, is one of those peculiar judicial fancies that, were
it not for the desirable results often achieved by their use, would be unqualifiedly con-
demned by all save those whose naive faith in the metaphysician's logic cannot be disturbed
by earthly facts."
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Several problems exist with this approach. A finding of conspiracy
liability based on the participation of a corporation is defensible only
to the extent that the corporation increases the individual's power to
harm society. Other rationales for conspiracy law, however, would not
be served if conspiracy liability were imposed in this situation. The
increased dangers thought to be presented by the mutual support pro-
vided by conspirators and the decreased opportunity for discovery of
the planned crime are not present when only one of the conspirators is
an individual. Similarly, the increased danger posed by a conspiracy
because it provides a focal point for additional crimes and criminal
education also is absent when only one individual is involved. These
concerns of conspiracy law are implicated only if more than one of the
conspirators is a natural person.1 78 Therefore, while some arguments
can be made in favor of imposing conspiracy liability, equally persua-
sive arguments can be raised against liability.
A further problem with this approach is the requirement of an
agreement. Even if plurality is defined to exist when one person acting
within the scope of employment commits a crime, conspiracy liability
cannot be imposed unless an agreement is established. 79 Conceivably,
an agreement may exist between the individual and the corporation on
the theory that the individual was acting in a dual capacity, and there-
fore both the individual and the corporation must be deemed to have
agreed on the course of conduct pursued. This approach is undesir-
able; it forces distortion of the definition of agreement beyond any ra-
tional or commonly understood meaning.1 80
178. Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 952: "[A] single person is not
punishable for intending to perform an act merely because he has at hand to effect his intent
means which can cause greater harm than could be produced were these means lack-
ing .... [A] trustee, intending to accomplish an unlawful object by means of his trust
would not be punished for conspiracy although the aggregate of economic power which he
controls might enable him to effect more damage than would be possible were he acting
without the trust. Although the corporation has legal personality for most purposes, for
purposes of determining whether there is a conspiracy the case of an agent and his corpora-
tion, when the agent is the sole human actor, seems analogous to that of the trustee and his
trust. The corporation seems an inanimate object analogous to a ... trust. Plurality in the
context of conspiracy should be viewed as aplurality of human minds, each of which is able
to contribute consciously to the furtherance of the conspiracy." (footnote omitted) (empha-
sis added).
179. Agreement is clearly an element of criminal conspiracy. United States v. Bailey,
607 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). The courts often refer to
agreement as the "gist" of a conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
180. The definition of agreement recently has been expanded in another context. Tradi-
tionally, when one of two persons feigned agreement, the other party was deemed not to be
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In sum, the actions of a single agent of a corporation should not
constitute a plurality. A finding of plurality would not further all the
supposed goals of criminal conspiracy laws and would be contrary to
the commonly accepted definitions of an agreement to conspire. The
cases addressing this question support the point of view that criminal
conspiratorial liability cannot be established by a single agent of a
corporation.
Conspiracy Among Several Agents of a Single Corporation
The question whether multiple agents of the same corporation
constitute a plurality is also difficult to resolve. One reason for this
difficulty is that the issue is not often raised or analyzed."" Several of
the cases most frequently cited for the proposition that multiple agents
are a plurality do not specifically address the question and reach that
conclusion only implicitly.
Unreasoned Decisions
In one of the most frequently cited decisions, Nye & Nissen v.
United States,18 2 the indictment charged five defendants with filing
false invoices and with conspiracy to defraud the United States. The
defendants were Nye & Nissen, a corporation, and four individual
agents: Moncharsh, the president, director, and owner of thirty-three
percent of the corporation;8 3 Berman, a city sales manager; Goddard,
a shipping and receiving clerk; and Menges, an agent whose function
was not identified. Moncharsh, Berman, Goddard, and the corporation
were convicted, and Moncharsh and the corporation appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed their convictions,'8 4 holding that the
evidence was sufficient to establish that Moncharsh aided and abetted
filing of the false invoices. Although the several agents and their cor-
poration were convicted of conspiracy, the questions on appeal focused
only on the substantive counts of filing false invoices. 8 5 Consequently,
conspiring with anyone despite his or her intent and attempt to agree. The Model Penal
Code, however, has adopted the theory of unilateral conspiracy and would sustain a conspir-
acy conviction in a situation in which one actor only feigned agreement. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.03(l)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 comment at
104-06 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
181. Liberal conspiracy pleading rules hinder analysis of the multiple agent plurality
cases, just as they affect the single agent cases. See note 156 supra.
182. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
183. Moncharsh, the president and director, actually owned one-third of the stock of a
holding company that wholly owned Nye & Nissen. Id at 614.
184. Id at 620.
185. See id. at 618-19.
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the Nye & Nissen court cannot be said to have endorsed a finding of
plurality.
A similar lack of analysis was demonstrated in Alamo Fence Com-
pany v. United States.186 The indictment included eighteen counts for
submitting false statements on loans insured by the Federal Housing
Authority 187 and one count for conspiracy to submit false statements. 1
88
The parties indicted included the Alamo Fence Company, its president
and general manager, the officer manager, and an unspecified number
of subordinate employees. The company was convicted on the conspir-
acy count and thirteen of the eighteen substantive counts. The court
did not recount the fate of the individuals. 8 9 Again, the question of
intracorporate conspiracy was not addressed on appeal and the convic-
tion was affirmed.' 90
Rational Approaches to Pluraliy
Although these cases implicitly hold that multiple agents of a sin-
gle corporation constitute a plurality, they are unenlightening because
the courts do not discuss the issue. In contrast, in several other cases
the courts actually have attempted to define plurality. In State v.
186. 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957).
187. Intentionally making a false statement to influence in any way Federal Housing
Administration loan transactions constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1010 (1976).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
189. It would not have been surprising for the individuals to have been acquitted while
the corporation was convicted. See note 114 supra.
190. 240 F.2d at 183.
In Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939), three defendants were in-
dicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States by submitting fraudulent claims for un-
derweight bags of cement delivered to government building projects. The three defendants
were two brothers, Jacob and Max Mininsohn, and the Interstate Lumber Company, a cor-
poration owned and controlled by the Mininsohns. The three defendants were convicted,
and Jacob and the corporation appealed.
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy
against Jacob to present a question for the jury, and that the guilty intent of corporate of-
ficers would be imputed to the corporation. The convictions of both Jacob and the corpora-
tion were affirmed. No question of intracorporate conspiracy was argued or analyzed.
In Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), the indictment charged the
Union Electric Company of Missouri and its president and director, Egan, with conspiracy
to violate the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1935), by
creating and maintaining a slush fund for political contributions. Also named in the indict-
ment as unindicted co-conspirators were Boehm, a director, and Laun, a vice-president of
the company. Egan and the company were both convicted on the conspiracy count, and
they appealed.
On appeal, the question of intracorporate plurality was not presented or discussed.
Thus, as in the previous cases, conspiracy convictions were affirmed based on a conspiracy
among agents of a single company, although the specific issue was not argued or analyzed.
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Parker,191 for example, the information charged four defendants with
conspiracy to convert to corporate use funds that were paid to the cor-
poration in its capacity as a trustee. The defendants were the Parker-
Smith Company and three individuals who were the sole directors and
officers of the corporation.
Appealing their convictions, the four defendants argued that the
corporation was incapable of forming a criminal intent, and thus could
not be included in the plurality necessary to find a conspiracy. The
court first noted that this issue was moot because plurality clearly was
established by the three individual officers of the corporation. Never-
theless, the court asserted that criminal intent could be imputed to a
corporation, and so the corporation could be a party to conspiracy.1 92
In United States v. Bridell,193 the defendants were indicted for con-
spiring to attempt to evade payment of income taxes.1 94 The three de-
fendants included the Carbon Corporation; Bridell, who was the
president as well as a director and shareholder of Carbon; and Blauner,
the treasurer, also a director and shareholder. The defendants argued
that there could be no conspiracy between a corporation and its of-
ficers, citing Carroll.'95 The court merely responded that "the conspir-
acy count does not overextend the fiction of corporate personality in
the inst.nt case."' 96 The court concluded, however, that the evidence
was insufficient to establish a conspiracy, and acquitted all the defend-
ants on that basis.
The Bridell opinion may not provide any useful analysis for courts
faced with the plurality issue. The court's statement that the conspiracy
count did not "overextend the fiction of corporate personality in the
instant case" mimics the language of Carroll.197 Any reliance that the
Bridell court may have placed on Carroll, however, was misplaced.
Carroll considered a question different from that presented in BridelI.
Carroll involved only one party, acting alone on behalf of a corpora-
tion. In contrast, BrIdell involved two agents acting for a corporation.
Thus the question in Bridell was not whether the legal fiction of corpo-
191. 114 Conn. 354, 158 A. 797 (1932).
192. The court concluded that a corporation may be "counted in computing the number
necessary to constitute [the conspiracy]." Id at 364, 158 A. at 801.
193. 180 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
194. Id at 273.
195. See United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), discussed in notes
162-69 & accompanying text supra.
196. 180 F. Supp. at 273.
197. See United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. at 941.
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rate personality would be overextended, but rather whether defendants
Bridell and Blauner constituted a plurality.
In United States v. Kemmel,198 the indictment charged three de-
fendants with conspiring to defraud the United States in their perform-
ance of a government contract. The defendants were Kemmel, Inc.;
John B. Kemmel, its president and principal shareholder; and Frank
Laurelli, an employee of Kemmel, Inc. and superintendent of the gov-
ernment job in question. 199
Kemmel, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that a corporation is "incapable of being a party to a conspir-
acy." 200 In response, the court cited numerous cases finding conspira-
cies among corporations and their officers and agents. Many of these,
however, were antitrust cases, 20 1 and none analyzed the question of the
plurality requirement in intracorporate conspiracy under the general
criminal laws. After this extensive citation of cases, 202 the court pro-
vided no explanation of its own holding and held that conspiracy was
properly charged. In the final paragraph of its opinion, the court fur-
ther obscured its ruling by suggesting that it relied on the involvement
of some "others to the grand jury unknown."
20 3
In United States v. Allied Chemical Corp. ,204 the corporation and
five individual employees and agents were charged with conspiracy.
After indictment, the government stipulated that, despite the indict-
ment's reference to "divers other persons, '205 there were in fact no con-
spirators other than the six named defendants.20 6 The court dismissed
the conspiracy count against the corporation.
Although the analysis in Allied Chemical is more helpful than the
198. 160 F. Supp. 718 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
199. The indictment included the standard allegations that the defendants conspired
among themselves and with "diverse other persons to the Grand Jury unknown." Id at 719.
200. Id. at 718-19. Defendant apparently relied on Holland Furnace Co. v. United
States, 158 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946), but the court stated that Holland must be limited to its
own facts. 160 F.Supp. at 720.
201. 160 F. Supp. at 720 (citing White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theater Corp., 129
F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942) (civil antitrust); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F.
Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1906) (criminal antitrust)).
202. On the question of the liability of a corporation for criminal conspiracy, the court
provided no fewer than 54 citations. 160 F. Supp. at 720-21.
203. "The present indictment charges that Kemmel, Laurelli, the corporation, and
others to the grand jury unknown, conspired. Assuming, as we must on a motion to dismiss,
the allegations of the indictment to be true, we hold that a conspiracy as to the corporation
and others has been properly charged." Id at 721.
204. No. 76-0129, slip op. (E.D. Va. July 6, 1976).
205. Id at 1.
206. Id
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many criminal cases that rule on questions of plurality only implicitly,
it suffers from two weaknesses. First, the court relied exclusively on
civil antitrust and breach of contract conspiracy cases for precedents.
The plurality standards in those areas reflect concerns unique to the
substantive law and are therefore inappropriate precedents outside
those areas.
207
The second weakness of Allied Chemical is that the court posed the
question incorrectly, inquiring whether the corporation conspired with
itself. In this respect, theAllied Chemical decision illustrates a difficulty
in analyzing the definition of plurality: the cases consistently frame the
issue inaccurately. The question is not whether the corporation can
conspire with itself20 8 or whether the corporation can conspire with its
agents.20 9 A corporation is liable only vicariously, through the actions
of its agents.210 Properly posed, the question is in two parts: whether
multiple agents of a single corporation constitute a plurality; and, if so,
whether the standards of corporate criminal liability are met so that the
corporation is vicariously liable for the conspiracies of its agents. If the
agents of a single company do compose a plurality, they may be held
liable as conspirators. If the agents compose a plurality and the stan-
dards of corporate criminal liability are met, then the individual agents
and the corporation may be held liable as conspirators. The question
of plurality is entirely separate from the question of corporate criminal
liability. The two issues should not be confused by posing the question
as whether the corporation may be "counted" as a conspirator to estab-
lish plurality.21
207. See text accompanying notes 60, 97-98 supra.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va.
July 6, 1976) ("the effect of a charge of conspiracy as between Allied and its agents is, insofar
as Allied is involved, a charge of conspiracy with itself').
209. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D. Ohio
1976) ("The Court concludes then that a corporation can be charged with conspiring with its
corporate personnel."); United States v. Bridell, 180 F. Supp. 268, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1960) ("De-
fendants also contend that there can be no conspiracy between a corporation and its of-
ficers."); State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 364, 158 A. 797, 800 (1932) ("Another contention is
that the corporation could not be a party to a conspiracy so that individuals could conspire
with it .... ").
210. See notes 107-08 & accompanying text supra.
211. The utility of adopting such a two-step analysis to consider the plurality question
has been endorsed by commentators investigating the same issue in antitrust and civil rights
law. See Bamdt, supra note 32, at 184 (stating that the question under the antitrust law is
"whether a conspiracy can exist between the officers of a corporation acting among them-
selves in its behalf; and if so, whether the corporation can be held liable"); Intracorporate
Conspiracies, supra note 38, at 487 (proposing a comparable two-part analysis for plurality
in civil rights conspiracies).
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In United States v. Consolidated Coal Co.,212 the indictment
charged Consolidated Coal and eight of its agents with two conspira-
cies. 213 The company filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing
that "a corporation may not be charged or convicted of conspiring
solely with its own employees.
214
Overruling the motion to dismiss, the court noted that the corpo-
rate defendant had cited only antitrust and civil conspiracy cases in
support of its argument. The court found the Sherman Act cases "in-
apposite" because they were based on the restraint of trade concept.
215
It found the civil cases involving conspiracies to induce breach of con-
tract "inapplicable" because the fiction of the corporate entity does not
protect individuals from criminal liability, even if it may protect them
from contract liability.
216
The court next noted that, while no case had analyzed the precise
question involved,217 several cases considering criminal conspiracies
had reached the same result, finding a conspiracy among a corporation
and its agents. The court then cited several cases that did not discuss
the specific issue, but did recognize implicitly that "a corporation can
be prosecuted for conspiring with its corporate personnel. '218 Finally,
the court reasoned that employment does not so merge an individual
with a corporation that only one entity remains. When "separate indi-
212. 424 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
213. Count I alleged a conspiracy to defraud the United States in its administration of
the coal dust sampling program, and Count II alleged a conspiracy to violate the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. The indictment also included 170 counts of violating the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 819 (1976). 424 F. Supp. at 578-79.
214. 424 F. Supp. at 579.
215. Id
216. Id (quoting United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962)). After reviewing
United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), discussed in notes 162-69 &
accompanying text supra, the court concluded that Carroll "must be read in light of its facts
and limited to them." 424 F. Supp. at 580. The court's statement that Carroll must be "read
in light of its facts" is true of most cases. The court's conclusion that Carroll must be "lim-
ited" to its facts is ambiguous. The court discussed the fact that the company in Carroll was
dominated by the individual defendant, and then quoted a passage from Carroll explaining
why conspiracy is not applied when only one person is involved. Id. As the court discussed
both these factors, it is unclear which the court relied on as the persuasive distinguishing
factor of Carroll. Probably the best approach is that Carroll is distinguishable from Consoli-
dated Coal because Carroll involved only one person, and not because of any domination of
the company by the individual. The court hinted at this result later in its opinion when it
discussed the presence in Consolidated Coal of separate individual judgments. Id. at 581.
217. 424 F. Supp. at 580: "In researching this issue the Court did not find any case which
analyzed the precise question presented herein."
218. Id at 581 (citing Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949); United States
v. Bridell, 180 F. Supp. 268 (N.D. IlI. 1960); United States v. Kemmel, 160 F. Supp. 718
(M.D. Pa. 1958)).
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vidual judgments" can be made by both a corporation and one or more
employees, the corporation may be charged with conspiring with its
employees.
219
The Consolidated Coal opinion offers several useful points of anal-
ysis. The court avoids the common difficulty of analogizing antitrust
and civil rights conspiracy precedents to a criminal conspiracy case, but
nevertheless frames the issue incorrectly. A corporation is liable only
vicariously; it does not act on its own. Thus, the question is not
whether the corporation conspired with its employees; rather, the ques-
tion is whether the corporation is vicariously liable for the conspiracy
among the several employees.
Even if the question is framed in terms of whether the corporation
may be "counted" in determining plurality, framing the question in
that manner causes confusion. If two or more agents are involved in
the conspiracy, plurality is established whether or not the corporation is
counted.220 When there is only a single individual involved, courts ana-
lyzing the issue have held that there is no plurality.221 Moreover, even
if the corporation were included to establish plurality, the conspiracy
would still fail for lack of agreement.
222
Criminal conspiracy cases indicate that multiple agents of a single
corporation should constitute a plurality.2 -3 This general rule conflicts
with the plurality rule of conspiracy in other areas of law. In both anti-
trust and civil rights conspiracies, courts regularly hold that a conspira-
torial plurality is not established by several agents of a single
corporation.2 4 In some criminal conspiracies, courts have relied on
219. 424 F. Supp. at 581.
220. This point was recognized in State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 364, 158 A.797, 800
(1932), in which the court stated that whether the corporation could be counted was aca-
demic because there were two individual defendants.
221. See, eg., Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909);
United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Santa Rita
Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113 P. 620 (1911).
222. See notes 179-80 & accompanying text supra.
223. Only one case has held that multiple agents of a corporation cannot constitute a
plurality. See United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129 slip op. (E.D. Va. July 6,
1976). In contrast, several courts have held that multiple agents may suffice for plurality.
See, eg., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233,253 (D.C. Cir. 1942), a7'd,
317 U.S. 519 (1943); State v. Parker, 114 Conn. 354, 364, 158 A.797, 800 (1932); People v.
Dunbar Contracting Co., 151 N.Y.S. 164, 166 (1914); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn.
618, 670, 100 S.W. 705, 718 (1907). See generally Developments--Criminal Conspiracy,
supra note 2, at 951.
224. See, e-g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953) (antitrust); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190
(7th Cir. 1972) (civil rights). See notes 165, 168, 201-02 & accompanying text supra.
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antitrust and civil rights precedents.2 25 This reliance is unsound226 be-
cause the rule in those areas-that agents of a single company do not
compose a plurality-reflects concerns of those particular substantive
bodies of law. Specifically, the antitrust rule is designed to limit auto-
matic antitrust liability for routine business decisions made within one
company by parties who are not competitors, 22 7 and the comparable
civil rights rule is a response to a perceived need to limit the civil rights
law to prevent it from becoming a general federal tort law.22
8
Instead of referring to inappropriate precedents from other sub-
stantive areas, the plurality definition for the general criminal law
should be determined by analyzing which formula best serves the pur-
poses of criminal conspiracy law. The main theme of criminal conspir-
acy laws is the presumption that an increased number of participants
result in increased power and therefore in increased danger to society.
A conspiracy is considered more powerful than an individual because
multiple participants make more likely the achievement of the object of
the conspiracy and less likely its detection, and because it allows the
pursuit of complex criminal objectives. The law thus presumes that the
collaboration of individuals increases the quality and quantity of dan-
ger to society.
229
Arguably, however, this presumption may be inapplicable when
the conspiracy occurs exclusively among agents of a single company in
the course of employment. A corporation may have only a limited
amount of power to exert; this power remains the same whether exer-
cised by one or a number of its agents. For example, if the chief corpo-
rate counsel decides to understate corporate income on the corporate
tax return, the danger to society is the same whether the counsel acts
alone or conspires with the entire legal staff of the company.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 76-0129 slip op. (E.D. Va. July
6, 1976) (relying on antitrust and civil rights cases); United States v. Kemmel, 160 F. Supp.
718 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (relying on antitrust cases); United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (same). See also Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 2, at 952.
226. United States v. Consolidated Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1976), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 212-19 supra, has been the only case to recognize this
explicitly. It described antitrust precedents as "inapposite" to the criminal case under deci-
sion. 424 F. Supp. at 579,
227. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra.
229. See notes 128-40 & accompanying text supra. See also Goldstein, supra note 130, at
414: "Under conspiracy law, on the other hand, all groups are conclusively presumed to
render the proscribed object more attainable, the criminal intent more firmly held and the
consequent imposition of additional punishment justifiable. Ordinarily, no effort is made to
determine from the facts of each case or class of case the essential issue of whether society
has more to fear from the plan of two than from the deed of one."
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At a minimum, whether the power of the conspiracy and therefore
the danger to society actually are increased by more people or remain
constant in the intracorporate context depends on the specific employ-
ees and company involved, the industry structure, the criminal objec-
tive contemplated, and other such factors unique to each case. Thus,
the presumption of increased danger may not be accurate when applied
to conspiracies that are exclusively intracorporate. Ideally, each case
should be examined individually to determine whether the facts war-
rant the conclusion that society faces more danger because of the par-
ticipation of more than one agent.2 30 If the factual examination reveals
that the power to harm society is increased by the participation of mul-
tiple agents, the agents should be deemed a plurality and held liable for
conspiracy. In contrast, if the facts reveal no increase in the power to
harm society resulting from the participation of more than one agent,
the agents should not be defined as a plurality and no conspiracy
charge should be upheld.
A finding that multiple agents of a single corporation can consti-
tute a plurality may not serve some purposes of conspiracy law. Never-
theless, several dangers targeted for prevention by conspiracy law are
present when multiple agents of a single corporation conspire. The
members provide each other with mutual support, encouragement, and
an education in criminal methods. The intracorporate conspiracy also
can serve as a focal point for further crimes and produce general social
tensions, dangers that the criminal conspiracy laws theoretically seek to
prevent.
Therefore, while not all the dangers posed by conspiracies are
present when the conspiracy is intracorporate, many of the dangers
contemplated by criminal conspiracy law arise in that context. A case-
by-case review of potential conspiracy dangers, however, would burden
the courts with extensive factual investigation, and such review is likely
to have results that are only slightly better than a fixed rule. On bal-
ance, therefore, the most useful analysis of intracorporate plurality is
the current rule, which presumes an intracorporate conspiracy to be
more harmful to society than individual action and so defines agents
always to constitute a plurality.
Conclusion
Two areas of criminal law that have experienced a steadily ex-
panding scope of liability are conspiracy and corporate liability. These
230. See Goldstein, supra note 130, at 461.
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areas intersect on the issue of the plurality element of conspiracy when
a single corporation's agent or agents are the conspirators. The first
question is whether plurality is established between a single agent and
the corporation. This question has not arisen under civil rights conspir-
acy law; under antitrust conspiracy law, plurality does not exist. Crimi-
nal conspiracy cases reach the same result: no plurality exists between
a single agent and the corporation. This result best serves the theoreti-
cal purposes of the criminal conspiracy laws, and is consistent with
conspiracy's requirement of agreement.
When two or more agents of a corporation are involved, questions
of plurality persist, and the law is far from clear. Courts have been
confused in articulating the issue. The question is not whether the cor-
poration can be counted in determining plurality or whether the corpo-
ration conspired with itself or with its agents. Corporations are liable
only vicariously for crimes, including conspiracy; therefore, a two-step
inquiry is required. The courts should consider first whether the agents
together compose a plurality: if so, they may be liable individually for
conspiracy; if not, no conspiracy exists at all. If the agents are deemed
to constitute a plurality, the second question is whether the standards of
corporate criminal liability have been met. If they are not met, the
corporation is not liable, even though the individual agents may be.
On the other hand, if the standards of corporate criminal liability are
met, the corporation is vicariously liable for the crimes of its agents,
including their conspiracies. As this two-step analysis indicates, plural-
ity and corporate criminal liability are separate issues.
The answer to the first inquiry, whether multiple agents of a single
company are a plurality, varies depending on the type of conspiracy
involved. Some courts have not noted the differences between criminal
conspiracy and other conspiracies, and therefore have relied on inappo-
site decisions. Usually, in antitrust and civil rights conspiracies, several
agents of a single company cannot constitute a plurality, yet they are a
plurality for general criminal conspiracies. The antitrust and civil
rights rules reflect concerns tailored to those respective bodies of law.
Courts have used this limiting rule to avoid conspiratorial liability in
situations that those substantive laws were not intended to reach. Such
concerns do not apply to criminal conspiracy law, so an analysis of the
criminal plurality rules should not rely on analogies to the plurality
rules used in antitrust and civil rights.
The best approach is to analyze the criminal plurality rules with
reference to the underlying purposes of criminal conspiracy law. The
definition of multiple agents of a single corporation as a plurality serves
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most, but not all, of the stated rationales of criminal conspiracy laws.
On balance, therefore, defining multiple agents to be a plurality in the
criminal context is the better rule.
